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ABSTRACT
The first chapter contributes to the debate about culture as potential determinant
of economic growth by investigating the prevalence of six widely discussed norms of
distributive justice in poor, rural communities of Malawi. Specifically, the distribution
over strict egalitarianism, inequality aversion, liberal egalitarianism, luck egalitarian-
ism, libertarianism, and the principle of equality of opportunity is determined using a
lab-in-the-field experiment. I am using a two-person dictator game with a production
phase. I find that decisions are mainly guided by strict egalitarianism and libertari-
anism, and less strongly by other norms. Interestingly, despite the large influence of
strict egalitarianism, subjects react significantly to all experimental variations.
The second chapter draws lessons from an original randomized experiment in
Malawi. In order to understand why roads in relatively good condition in rural areas
may not be used by buses, a minibus service was subsidized over a six month period
over a distance of 20 kilometres to serve five villages. Using randomly allocated prices
for use of the bus, this experiment demonstrates that at very low prices, bus usage
is high. Bus usage decreases rapidly with increased prices. However, based on the
results on take-up and minibus provider surveys, this experiment demonstrates that
at any price, low (with high usage) or high (with low usage), a bus service provider
never breaks even on this road.
The third chapter explores the effect of incomplete information about pie size on
social norms motivated by the following observations: (a) cultural norms regarding
distributive justice may be fully internalized by a population or be domain-specific
xii
to a particular informational environment and (b) each scenario may lead to different
impacts on growth and development in dynamic surroundings. The chapter studies
how divisions of an effort-generated social surplus depend on whether the receiver in
a dictator game knows the size of the social surplus or not. I find that while dictators
act more selfish under incomplete information the effect is small compared to the
effects norms of distributive justice have on decision making.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Norms of Distributive Justice in Rural Malawi
1.1 Introduction
Throughout the world, across all societies, individuals engage in various forms of re-
distribution, be it unemployment insurance benefits from taxes paid by employers in
the USA, the meticulous distribution of the spoils of a hunt among the Dobe !Kung
of the Kalahari Desert,1 or the provision of financial support by friends in times of
hardship. As the examples suggest, redistribution can be organized through formal
or semi-formal institutions or occur in entirely informal settings. Its different aspects
have been studied by researchers from disciplines as diverse as law, anthropology, so-
ciology, or economics. In economics, a lot of emphasis has been placed on the rigorous
analysis of the incentives for productive activities set by redistributive systems.
Arguably, the more informal the setting in which redistribution takes place, the more
can be learned about these incentives by studying the underlying norms of distribu-
tive justice of the population. Due to the relative paucity of formal institutions in
developing countries, particularly in rural areas, the study of sharing norms among
African villagers is therefore highly suitable to inform the long standing and con-
1See, for example, Lee (1993) for a description of the social life of the Dobe !Kung, including
their sharing rituals.
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troversial debate about culture as one key determinant of economic development,2
beyond providing an answer to the question of what constitutes distributive justice
in the minds of the study population, which, by itself, may be highly relevant for
enriching models in development economics.
Specifically, this paper studies the distribution of six frequently discussed norms of
distributive justice in one of the poorest regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. It informs
the debate about the relationship between culture and economic growth by investigat-
ing the prevalence of strict egalitarianism, inequality aversion, liberal egalitarianism,
luck egalitarianism, libertarianism, and the principle of equality of opportunity for a
representative population from villages of Malawi’s Central Region. To this end, a
lab-in-the-field experiment in form of a one-shot two-person dictator game with pro-
duction stage was employed. In addition to the experimental data, I collected baseline
information on demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the participants.
The outcomes of the game reveal how effort-generated income is shared between in-
dividuals who may differ with respect to assigned rates of return, income shocks,
and opportunities to exert effort, as well as chosen effort levels. Randomly selected
participants were assigned to one of seven treatments. The treatments differed with
respect to how many effort levels were available to the participants and whether their
initial endowment could be reduced by a random income shock. In the “Benchmark
Treatment”, neither could happen to either player. In the three “Equality of Op-
portunity Treatments”, either the dictator, or the receiver, or both players faced a
reduced choice set of effort levels, i.e. either one or both players could not exert
the highest level of effort available to the players in the Benchmark Treatment. In
the “Income Shock Treatments”, either the dictator, or the receiver, or both players
2See Weber (1992) for a seminal paper.
2
faced a negative income shock to their monetary endowment which was made known
to both players just prior to the distribution of the pie.
Common across all treatments was the way social surplus (i.e. the pie to be shared
between dictator and receiver) had to be generated: Subjects needed to separate two
types of beans. This effort task was not only familiar to the participants, but also to
the greatest possible extent free of any inherently motivating aspects, independent of
skill, level of practice,3 education, gender, and other demographic or socio-economic
characteristics (based on piloting outcomes).4 Another common aspect among all
treatments was that participants could be assigned either a high or low rate of return
for their effort. This experimental variation was introduced to be able to distinguish
between contribution-rewarding norms and primarily effort-rewarding norms.
My results suggest that dictators are not merely concerned about their own income,
but also take several other factors into account when making distributional choices:
First, dictators react as intuitively expected to all (exogenous) experimental varia-
tions, i.e. dictators reward higher rates of return, and take reduced choice sets and
income shocks into account when making their decisions. Second, dictators clearly
reward both own and others’ effort. Third, despite the first two findings, the highest
percentage of observations and individuals must be categorized as strict egalitarian.
Finally, demographic and socio-economic characteristics generally matter little for de-
termining a player’s overall generosity, or which norm predictions her decisions match.
Though this study relates to classical empirical work on culture and economic growth,
3The average time it took the author and members of her data entry staff to sort a specific
amount of beans did not differ significantly from the average time it took an “experienced” female
participant to sort the same amount of beans.
4The only potential exception is high age. A minority among the elderly participants had to
exert more effort than the average participant for sorting the same amount of beans, due to limited
mobility. I will return to and discuss this observation in section 4, during data analysis.
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the approach taken puts it more in line with the growing experimental evidence shed-
ding light on the nature of social norms in developing countries, a line of research
that emerged with the application of behavioral economics to the development litera-
ture. Most of this experimental evidence, however, pertains to unearned income (see
Camerer (2003) for a survey of dictator game application). Since it is conceivable
that different norms are applied to windfall as compared to earned or, more specifi-
cally, effort-generated income, the transferability of most of the current evidence to
typical growth-relevant economic situations may be very limited, i.e. the majority of
documented behavior might be highly domain-specific and less relevant to learning
about incentives for productive activities in a community.5
One notable exception is the recent study of Jakiela (2009) who investigated how
subjects in rural Kenya divide windfall as opposed to effort-generated income in com-
parison to U.S. American subjects. For this purpose, she employed four different
types of dictator games which can be categorized according to two questions: (a)
How the social surplus was generated (whether through rolling a dice or through
subjects’ effort), and (b) who generated the social surplus (i.e. dictator or receiver).
She finds that subjects in both locations clearly reward their own effort. However,
the evidence for the Kenyan sample on the question of whether subjects also reward
others’ effort is mixed. This can be clearly established only for the U.S. sample. Also,
while her study is closest to this research in underlying motivation, it is not aimed at
distinguishing various norms of distributive justice, nor at highlighting any potential
trade-off between selfishness and fairness as will be established in section 4 of this
paper.
5In addition, this literature is of limited usefulness to inform any discussion about norms of
distributive justice (as compared to sharing behavior) since only few such norms are defined on
windfall income.
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More generally, the present study is closer in design to experiments that have been
conducted in developed countries regarding effort rewarding behavior of individuals
(see Konow (2000) for a prominent example of this sub-branch of the literature).
Specifically, the experimental design is based on the work of Cappelen et al. (2007)
who employ one-shot two-player dictator games and find that out of those 35 percent
of their subjects who mostly act in line with their ideas of fairness, 43.5 percent are
strict egalitarians, 38.1 percent are liberal egalitarians, and 18.4 percent act libertar-
ian. I modify and extend the design in Cappelen et al. (2007) in several important
ways. First, investment is replaced by a simple effort task for the study of strict
egalitarianism, libertarianism, and the traditionally effort-defined principle of liberal
egalitarianism. Second, whether people consider equality of opportunity is deter-
mined by adding novel treatments: restrictions on the opportunity to exert effort
are introduced for subjects assigned to these treatments. Third, luck egalitarian-
ism is explored. It is based on income differences, which are not due to production
choices. Thus, I bring in various income shock treatments to investigate whether this
principle plays a role in decision making. Fourth, the information structure of the
game is altered to credibly test for a simple version of inequality aversion, defined as
individuals striving for exactly equalizing final payoffs (rather than merely sharing
the social surplus equally). Fifth, dictators’ preferences are elicited using the strat-
egy method, which allows me to talk about self-consistency of individuals. Sixth, I
link the experimental results to a rich set of demographic and socio-economic data.
Last, I study the norms of randomly chosen participants from Malawian villages, as
opposed to a student population in an industrialized country. Arguably, the former
has more significance for enriching the discussion about norms and incentives set for
productive activities in a society due to the widespread lack of formal institutions in
rural Malawi, as laid out above.
5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structural
model and provides definitions of the norms of distributive justice. In section 3, a
discussion of the experimental design is provided. Section 4 offers an overview of
the field experimental procedures. Section 5 discusses empirical results. Section 6
concludes.
1.2 Model
The subsequent discussion closely follows Cappelen et al. (2007). I study two-person
dictator games with a production phase. Individual i is denoted i = 1 when i is
the dictator and i = 2 when i is the receiver. The players may differ with respect
to effort chosen, ei, and rate of return, ai. Dictators and receivers both partici-
pate in production which takes place using the function xi = eiai. Thus, the dic-
tator’s and the receiver’s effort-generated income is determined by the production
functions x1 = e1a1 and x2 = e2a2, respectively. The total effort-generated income
6
that is to be distributed among team members by the dictator is therefore given
by X(e, a) = x1(e1, a1) + x2(e2, a2), where e and a are defined as e = (e1, e2) and
a = (a1, a2). Specifically, each dictator is asked to allocate an amount y of the so-
cial surplus to herself, leaving X − y for the receiver. Dictators and receivers have
additional income in the form of their endowments, and through foregoing options
to exert effort as will be explained in detail in section 3. For modeling purposes, it
suffices to denote the entirety of their respective non-effort-generated incomes as z1
and z2, with z = (z1, z2).
Based on the framework in Cappelen et al. (2007), I assume that individuals care
about both their own income and the fairness of the distribution between themselves
6Total effort-generated income is also referred to as “social surplus” or “money in the common
pot” throughout this paper.
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and the player matched with them, with dictators maximizing the utility function
V (y; e, a, z, b, s) = γy −
∑
k
βk
(y −mk(e, a, z, b, s))2
2X(e, a)
.
Here, mk(e, a, z, b, s) is the fair amount of effort-generated income that the dictator
should keep for herself according to norm k; b1 and b2 are the sets of effort choices
available to the players with b = (b1, b2); γ > 0 and βk ≥ 0 are parameters expressing
the importance subjects assign to income and fairness, respectively; s = (s1, s2) de-
notes negative shocks to z,7 where s1 ≤ 0 and s2 ≤ 0.
Maximizing this function determines the optimal share y∗ to be
y∗ =
∑
k βkm
k(e, a, z, b, s)∑
k βk
+
γX(e, a)∑
k βk
,
assuming that an interior solution exists. Note, that the optimal amount a specific
dictator allots to herself depends on her fairness ideals and how much money is in the
common pot.
Expanding on the set of norms studied in Cappelen et al. (2007), I assume that every
dictator follows at least one of the following principles of distributive justice: strict
egalitarianism (SE), inequality aversion (IA), liberal egalitarianism (LE), the princi-
ple of equality of opportunity (EO), libertarianism (L), or luck egalitarianism (LuE),
all of which satisfy the no-waste condition.8 These concepts are explained below,
using the optimal dictator share they imply.
According to strict egalitarianism it is optimal that dictators and receivers receive
7Note, that these shocks are known to the dictator prior to making any distributional decisions.
8Strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism are specified in a similar way to
that found in Cappelen et al. (2007), but with effort replacing investment.
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equal shares of the social surplus. The fair share for a dictator can thus be denoted
as
mSE(e, a, z, b, s) =
X(e, a)
2
. (1.1)
The principle of liberal egalitarianism bases optimal shares on the relative effort
choices of the players, hence,
mLE(e, a, z, b, s) =
e1
e1 + e2
X(e, a). (1.2)
In contrast to liberal egalitarianism, libertarianism is a purely outcome based princi-
ple. The dictator’s optimal share equals her effort-generated income:
mL(e, a, z, b, s) =
a1e1
a1e1 + a2e2
X(e, a) (1.3)
= a1e1.
The principle of equality of opportunity alters the latter two principles’ outlook in that
it allows for choice sets to be taken into account. According to this norm, individuals
should compensate themselves and others for reduced possibilities to exert effort,
if in general they follow a norm that includes effort as a sharing criterion and is
defined over the effort-generated income alone. The fair share for the dictator can be
characterized as
mEO(e, a, z, b, s) = ml + δ+EO(IDRC) + δ
−
EO(IRRC), (1.4)
where l ∈ {LE,L}, and δ+EO(IDRC) ≥ 0 and δ−EO(IRRC) ≤ 0 are parameters that
determine how much the dictator cares about the relative size of choice set, where
DRC stands for only the dictator having a reduced choice set and RRC stands for
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only the receiver having a reduced choice set. A relatively smaller choice set implies
a larger fair share for the affected player according to this norm. Note, that we only
know the direction but not the magnitude of this effect.
Inequality aversion in its simplest form requires total incomes of players to be equal-
ized in an optimal allocation. The fair share for the dictator is given by
mIA(e, a, z, b, s) = (z2 − z1) + X(e, a)− (z2 − z1)
2
(1.5)
if z1 ≤ z2, and
mIA(e, a, z, b, s) =
X(e, a)− (z1 − z2)
2
(1.6)
if z1 > z2.
In addition, a specific form of luck egalitarianism may influence distributional deci-
sions. In this case, the fair share for the dictator additionally depends on s, i.e. the
dictator takes differences in income which are independent of productive choices into
account (and occur ex post to the latter being carried out):
mLuE(e, a, z, b, s) = mj(e, a, z, b, s) + δ+LuE(IDS) + δ
−
LuE(IRS). (1.7)
Here, j ∈ {SE,LE,LL,L}, and δ+LuE(IDS) ≥ 0 and δ−LuE(IRS) ≤ 0 are parameters
that determine how much the dictator cares about the relative shock to players en-
dowment, where DS stands for only the dictator receiving a shock to her monetary
endowment and RS stands for only the receiver receiving a shock to her monetary en-
dowment. A one-sided negative shock implies a larger fair share for the affected player
according to this norm. Again, we only know the direction but not the magnitude of
this effect, which is an empirical matter.
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1.3 Experimental Design
The analysis in this paper is based on seven treatments of a one-shot, two-person
dictator game with a production stage.9 Participants were randomly selected among
the rural population of Ntchisi District in the Central Region of Malawi and assigned
to different treatments prior to the instruction phase. During the recruitment and
consenting phase, subjects were informed that they were eligible to participate in a
scientific experiment about community norms, including survey parts. More specif-
ically, individuals were told that the experiment would involve decision making and
potentially carrying out a simple task, similar to one that they might do at home
or work, as well as the distribution of money between themselves and another par-
ticipant of the experiment. They were informed that they would receive a token
gift worth approximately 30 Malawi Kwacha (MK) irrespective of their or others’
decision-making (including the decision to end participation early) and between 0
MK up to 350 MK10 depending on the outcome of the experiment. Additionally, po-
tential participants learned that total participation time (including travel, consenting,
experiment, surveys, and payment) would not exceed three hours.11
To assess the value of the incentives to participants, note that in 2005, 46.7 per-
cent of the population in the Central Region lived at or below the national poverty
line of 16,165 MK per year (i.e. approximately 44.29 MK per day) according to the
World Bank (2007). 16.1 percent of these individuals fell substantially below this
line and were classified as “ultra-poor”, where ultra-poor indicates the inability of
individuals to meet their recommended daily food needs. In addition to the generally
9The entire experiment consisted of eight treatments. The analysis of the eighth treatment in
conjunction with the benchmark treatment is the subject of Mueller (2011a), which studies the
effect of incomplete information the receiver has about the cake size on distributional decisions of
the dictator (see,f.ex., Ockenfels and Werner (2011), for related literature).
10At the time of the experiment, 350 MK corresponded to 2.18 US-Dollar (typical cash bid rate).
11De facto participation time was approximately 1.5 hours, see section 4. Three hours was men-
tioned as an upper limit based on an outlier during piloting.
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prevailing deep poverty, note that the data used in this paper was collected in July and
August 2010. Both months fall in the dry season which is characterized by especially
low, constant opportunity costs for participants. Goldberg (2010), for example, who
conducted a labor supply study in Malawi’s Central Region, offered various wages for
sessions of hard physical labor, and found that over 70 percent of her sample of 529
subjects chose to work at a rate of only 30 MK per day during the dry season. Thus,
the rewards provided by my experiment were substantial and clearly able to meet the
participation constraint of most individuals in the study region.
In terms of incentivizing strategic behavior we need to understand whether variations
of shares were meaningful to participants. I allowed dictators to vary shares in steps of
10 MK. Goods prices in the study region start at 0.5 MK, to the author’s knowledge.
However, in an informal focus group discussion conducted by study staff, it became
clear that variations of up to 5 MK were not uniformly perceived as meaningful by
individuals living in immediate proximity to the second biggest trading center of the
district (i.e. these individuals are likely to, on average, care less about small varia-
tions of income as compared to the average study participant). To be on the safe side,
I doubled this amount so that the smallest possible variation in the experiment was
10 MK.12 Given the extreme level of poverty of large parts of the population in the
study region, in combination with my findings from the focus group discussion, we
can be confident that variations available to dictators were large enough to incentivize
strategic behavior.
The rest of this section proceeds as follows. I begin by detailing the general exper-
imental procedure. I then turn to a description of the benchmark treatment, which
is based on the experimental design of Cappelen et al. (2007), and elaborate how it
12Examples of goods priced 10 MK in rural areas of the study district (at the time the study took
place) are a large piece of bread or a package of pain killers.
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allows for the identification of strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, libertarian-
ism and inequality aversion. I then introduce new measures of equality of opportunity
and luck egalitarianism, captured in the remaining six treatments. A description of
the respective contributions of each of these treatments towards identifying the pres-
ence of these two norms concludes.
1.3.1 General Experimental Procedure
For an overview of the steps involved in the experiment, please also refer to Figure
1 in the appendix. At the beginning of the instruction phase, subjects learned that
they were matched with another subject in the same location and that matching was
anonymous both during and after the experiment. Then they received their endow-
ments. Players’ monetary endowments were given to them in the form of bottle caps,
with one bottle cap representing 10 MK.13 This conversion rate was made known to
the players. Their non-monetary endowment was handed out in form of unsorted bags
of beans. Players were informed that one bag of beans was worth 20 MK if they chose
to return it to the experimenter without sorting. They learned that the alternative
was to return either one or - if they had more than one bag - all of their bags sorted.
Great care was taken to ensure that subjects understood that the money generated
by sorting was higher than that from returning unsorted bags, but that the former
would go into a common pot to be shared between them and the player matched
with them, while the latter would be their own with certainty. Players were assigned
either a low (40 MK per sorted bag) or high (80 MK per sorted bag) rate of return.
Individuals learned their own, but not their partner’s rate of return.
Players were then informed that just one subject in each group would be asked to
13A higher divisibility of currency was possible only to a limited extent. Since, in addition,
denominations lower than 10 MK did not appear to be economically significant to all potential
subjects, as explained above, the option of including those was not explored any further.
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make sharing decisions but it would only be revealed who were to be the dictators
after all sorting decisions had been carried out. With this important exception, the
strategy method was used (as detailed further in section 3), i.e. dictators would be
asked to share hypothetical common pots for all potential effort-choice/rate of return
combinations of the receiver given their own effort choice and rate of return.14 Pay-
ments were to be determined by the experimenter upon completion of the game and
would be based on the strategies specified by the dictators and the matched receivers’
sorting decisions and rates of return, i.e. the experimenter would look up what each
dictator’s payment plan specified for the actual number of bags sorted and rate of
return of the respective receiver and pay players accordingly. Subjects were told that
they would receive payment immediately after their participation in the study con-
cluded and were informed that all players would learn about their partner’s sorting
decision and rate of return at that point. It was further conveyed that the receiver
would only learn about the payoff relevant decisions of the dictator, but not have the
right to learn about the dictator’s entire strategy.
Summing up, players were given complete information about the game, including
production, distribution, and payment phase, prior to any decision making. Im-
portantly, the instruction phase was also designed to guarantee common knowledge
among matched players. Following the instruction phase and a brief test-sorting,15
players were asked to make their sorting decisions. After they carried out these de-
14The alternative would have been to elicit sharing preferences from both players for all possible
effort/rate of return combinations of their partner, then randomly determine who is to be the decision
maker. Though this would have had obvious logistical and financial benefits, in the 30+ rounds of
piloting for this experiment, evidence mounted that subjects viewed the game entirely differently
if randomization between players for the role of dictator took place after sharing decisions were
made. According to their own statements, subjects frequently kept less (more) than what they
would have perceived as optimal, had they been the dictator with certainty, when they thought
their opponent might be generous (selfish). In other words, they maximized their expected utility
taking into account how - according to their own expectations - their opponent might share the
common pot for each scenario.
15See section 4 for details.
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cisions they learned who had been assigned the role of the dictator. During the
subsequent distribution phase, in which the dictator made her sharing decisions, each
decision could be altered once before it was made final. During the payment phase
the experimenter determined final payoffs for each individual (given by the sum of the
monetary endowment, payment for bags which had been returned unsorted, and the
share of the common pot the individual was to receive based on the dictator’s wishes).
While subjects were paid, they learned as announced about the other player’s rate of
return and payoff relevant decisions.
This concludes the description of the general experimental procedures. I now provide
an in-depth discussion of each treatment and its contribution towards generating a
distribution over the norms of distributive justice listed in section 2, before turning
to matters of implementation in the field in section 4.
1.3.2 Benchmark Treatment
In the benchmark treatment, each participant was given an endowment of 3 bottle
caps and 2 bags of beans. Sorted bags generated an income of 4 bottle caps per bag
for individuals who had been assigned a low rate of return, and 8 bottle caps per bag
for individuals who had been assigned a high rate of return. Each player had the
option to sort either 0, 1, or 2 bags, with unsorted bags being automatically returned
to the experimenter at the rate of 2 bottle caps per bag, independent of the subject’s
assigned rate of return.16
As in Cappelen et al. (2007), the benchmark treatment is used to learn about the dis-
tribution over strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism among
subjects. Additionally, due to our modified experimental procedures in which sub-
16Please refer to Table 1 in the appendix for a graphical depiction of the production function.
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jects were able to observe endowments and money from returning unsorted bags not
only for themselves, but also for the other player in addition to the common pot prior
to each allocation decision, it is sensible to also test for and determine the frequency
of inequality aversion as guiding norm for allocation decisions of the dictator. Allo-
cations in which the dictator took the entire common pot are called purely selfish for
the purpose of this discussion.
Graphically depicting the various norms’ predictions highlights important features of
the decision making process of the subjects and (through that) how the benchmark
treatment allows us to identify the discussed norms: Decisions in line with libertarian
predictions (see Figure 3) have the lowest informational requirements of all alloca-
tions. The dictator only needs to know her own marginal contribution to the social
surplus since it always equals her optimal share. Purely selfish and strict egalitarian
allocations are based on information about the size of the common pot, i.e. both
players’ contributions: individuals keep 100 percent and 50 percent of the common
pot, respectively (see Figure 4). Liberal egalitarian allocations are proportional to
relative effort levels, varying with the common pot size. As the dictator increases her
effort, her optimal share increases due to the associated increase in common pot size
and the higher relative effort level of the dictator as compared to the receiver. The
norm’s predictions are therefore depicted for different effort levels of the dictator given
the receiver’s effort level and both players’ rate of return (see Figure 5 and Figure 1
in the appendix).17 Inequality aversion (see Figure 6) is depicted in the same way.
However, the mechanism through which higher effort levels of a player lead to higher
optimal shares for her is more indirect compared to liberal egalitarianism, working
through the increase in common pot size, as well as the fact that subjects who exert
more effort receive less income from returning unsorted bags, which must be taken
17Note, that effort levels and rates of return jointly determine common pot size.
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into account for equalizing final payoffs.
We can distinguish four categories of distributional scenarios:
1) Matched players are assigned the same rate of return and choose to
sort an identical number of bags. In case social surplus is generated,18 all norms
prescribe equal shares for the players.19
2) Matched players are assigned identical rates of return, but choose to
sort a different number of bags. With the exception of strict egalitarianism, all
norms prescribe an unequal distribution of the common pot.20
3) Matched players have different rates of return, but choose to sort an
identical number of bags. In such a case only libertarianism prescribes different
optimal shares for the two players.21
4) Matched players are assigned different rates of return and choose to sort
a different number of bags. Here, two sub-cases can be distinguished: i) If the
respective effort-generated earnings of the players do not coincide, optimal shares for
18If both players choose not to sort, no social surplus is generated.
19For example, if the rate of return is low for both players (ai = 1, aj = 1), and each player
sorts two bags (ei = 2, ej = 2), the size of the social surplus is X = 160 and all three norms
tested for in the benchmark treatment predict a dictator share of yi = 80. Only purely selfish
allocations are characterized by yi = 160. This is the case since both players exerted same effort
(hence liberal egalitarianism suggests equal shares to be optimal), contributed the same amount
to the social surplus (hence libertarianism suggests equal shares to be optimal), and do not differ
in their monetary endowment and payment for returning unsorted bags (hence inequality aversion
suggests equal shares to be optimal). Equal shares are (trivially) optimal under strict egalitarianism.
20For example, if the rates of return are high for both players (ai = 2, aj = 2), and the dictator
sorts one bag (ei = 1), while the other player does not sort at all (ej = 0), the size of the social
surplus is X = 80. In this case, a dictator share of yi = 40 is optimal only under strict egalitarianism.
Libertarianism determines the optimal dictator share to be the contribution to the social surplus,
i.e. yi = 80. Liberal egalitarianism also prescribes yi = 80, since the receiver did not put any effort
into generating money for the common pot. Inequality aversion takes into account that the player
who sorted one bag less received 20 MK more from returning an additional unsorted bag compared
to the dictator. To equalize final amounts subjects take home, the dictator’s share must therefore
be 20 MK higher than that of the receiver, i.e. yi = 50.
21For example, if the rate of return is high only for the dictator (ai = 2, aj = 1), and each player
sorts two bags (ei = 2, ej = 2), the size of the social surplus is X = 240. Libertarianism predicts a
dictator share of yi = 160 since this equals her contribution to the common pot. A dictator following
strict egalitarianism trivially keeps yi = 120. This is also the optimal share according to inequality
aversion and liberal egalitarianism because both players exerted the same amount of effort.
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the players are different under all norms with the exception of strict egalitarianism.22
ii) If the effort-generated earnings of both players coincide, libertarianism and strict
egalitarianism prescribe equal shares. Liberal egalitarianism and inequality aversion
prescribe shares to be different.23
1.3.3 Equality of Opportunity Treatments
There are three treatments aimed at investigating whether and to what degree equal-
ity of opportunity plays a role for distributional decisions among the subject popula-
tion. One treatment introduces an “effort cap” only for the dictator, another only for
the receiver, and the third treatment introduces an effort cap for both players. Play-
ers with an effort cap received only one bag of beans, but 5 bottle caps as monetary
endowment. The endowment is chosen such that participants with an effort cap have
the same non-effort-generated income as benchmark treatment participants in case
of sorting either 0 or 1 bag. The goal is to make these treatments comparable to the
benchmark treatment for these effort choices in all respects other than the existence
of the effort cap.24
In treatments with unequal choice sets, the player with the smaller choice set should
22For example, if the rate of return is high only for the dictator (ai = 2, aj = 1), and she sorted
two bags while the receiver sorted only one (ei = 2, ej = 1), the size of the social surplus is X = 200.
While strict egalitarianism prescribes yi = 100, libertarianism asks for the dictator to keep her
marginal product to the social surplus, hence yi = 160. Liberal egalitarianism rewards the dictator
with two thirds of the money in the common pot since she exerted double as much effort as the
receiver, hence yi = 23200. Inequality aversion reimburses the dictator for foregoing the money from
returning her second bag unsorted (as compared to the receiver), thus the dictator’s share is 20 MK
larger than the receiver’s, i.e. yi = 110.
23For example, if the dictator has a low rate of return, ai = 1, and sorts two bags, ei = 2,
while the receiver has a high rate of return, aj = 2, and sorts one bag, ej = 1, the social surplus
generated is X = 160. Strict egalitarianism trivially prescribes yi = 80. Since this equals the
dictator’s marginal product, it is also the optimal share under libertarianism. According to liberal
egalitarianism yi = 23160 should be kept by the dictator, since she exerted double as much effort as
the receiver. yi = 90 is optimal according to inequality aversion, because the receiver has returned
an unsorted bag while the dictator has not, i.e. the dictator needs to get 20 MK more of the social
surplus than the receiver in order to equalize final payoffs.
24Please refer to Table 2 for the production function.
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receive a higher share of the social surplus as compared to that in the benchmark
treatment if a dictator follows the principle of equality of opportunity. In situations
where players’ rates of return and/or effort choices differ, the optimal amount for an
individual with a smaller choice set should exceed the optimal amount under liber-
tarianism or liberal egalitarianism. Note, however, that we only know the direction,
not the magnitude of the effect, which is to be determined empirically. Comparisons
of allocation decisions of the treatment in which both players have a limited choice
set to those of the benchmark treatment will allow us to control for treatment effects
independent of decision making which takes equality of opportunity into account.
The predictions for all other norms are identical to those for the benchmark treatment,
with the sole exception that the player(s) with a limited choice set cannot exert an
effort level of sorting two bags.
1.3.4 Income Shock Treatments
The income shock treatments aim at investigating whether and to what degree luck
egalitarianism forms a basis for distributional decisions among the subject popula-
tion. During instruction, participants assigned to these treatments learned about the
possibility that either they, the player matched with them, or both of them might
lose their monetary endowment, i.e. the three bottle caps given to them at the start.
Only after their sorting decision was carried out, was it revealed to them who had
in fact lost their endowment, i.e. production decisions took place in a symmetric
set-up. The goal was to create differences in income that were entirely independent
of production decisions and to analyze whether dictators would take such income
differences into account when distributing the social surplus generated on the basis
of those production decisions.
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In treatments with only one player experiencing a shock, this player would receive a
higher amount of the social surplus than she would in the benchmark treatment if
the dictator followed luck egalitarianism. Note, that we only know the direction, but
not the magnitude of the effect prior to estimation, as in the case of the ’equality of
opportunity’ treatments. Comparisons of allocation decisions made when both play-
ers experience a negative income shock to those of the benchmark treatment allow
me to control for treatment effects that are independent of luck egalitarianism.
The predictions for the other norms are the same as for the benchmark treatment
with the exception of inequality aversion (see Figure 7). Since inequality aversion
is defined over final outcomes, the norm’s prescriptions for treatments that are not
symmetric in income shocks must trivially differ from those for the benchmark treat-
ment. Specifically, the player who experiences a negative shock of 30 MK should be
fully compensated for this loss in the optimal allocation.
1.4 Field Experimental Procedures
The field implementation of this study comprised three distinct parts: a baseline sur-
vey, the game, and an opinion survey. For an overview of all steps involved, please
refer to Figure 2 in the appendix. The project took place in Ntchisi District, a poor,
rural district in Malawi’s Central Region. 80 rounds of the experiment were con-
ducted over a period of 20 days, 4 on each day. Each round required a minimum of
40 households out of which 16 participant households were randomly selected.
To avoid contamination of the experiment due to subjects learning about the game
from interaction with prior participants, precautions were taken regarding the loca-
tions of all rounds. To understand these precautions, it is useful to think of the
choice of location as being divided into two stages: the choice of where to perform
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the 4 sessions on a particular day (“area” for the sake of expositional clarity), and the
locational choice of each of these 4 places relative to each other (“location” for clarity).
Regarding the first stage, the area for each day was selected such that word of mouth
could not be reasonably expected to spread overnight between two areas that were
used on consecutive days. Areas were visited sequentially by moving outward from a
trading center, which is located close to the border of Ntchisi District. Each area had
to have at least 160 (4 times 40) households.25 Once an area had been chosen, four
clusters of dwellings with a minimum of forty households in each were identified. In
each of these locations, one experimental round was conducted. These four locations
were chosen such that they were segregated enough geographically to render commu-
nication between participants in different rounds infeasible.26
In each location, participants were recruited in the following way: Upon arrival, the
study team asked for assistance from either group village headmen27 or chiefs in draw-
ing up a map of the houses in that particular location. The houses were numbered
based on the order in which they were drawn. To determine which households were
eligible we then drew 16 numbers out of an envelope with as many numbered paper
slips as there were houses.28
Eligible households were approached with recruitment scripts. To determine who in
the household was eligible for participation, a household listing was compiled. It
25Information on electoral ward boundary demarcations provided by the Office of the District
Commissioner, in combination with location scouting data from an earlier joint project, Raballand
et al. (2011), aided in the selection of these areas.
26In some cases, a larger cluster of dwellings had two locations in them. However, for these cases,
two precautions were taken. First, two locations within one cluster were without exception used
for consecutive rounds only. Second, these places were always sufficiently spread out to have some
natural barrier between the two locations.
27A group village headman is the direct superior of several chiefs whose villages form a cluster.
28The remaining households were kept as back-ups to be visited in the order they would be drawn
should the need arise.
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included all adult members of the household who had been present in the household
the previous night.29 These household members were assigned numbers based on the
order in which they were mentioned. We then drew a numbered piece of paper out of
an envelope that contained as many numbered paper slips as candidates for partici-
pation in that particular household. This determined the eligible household member.
A back-up household was approached in case of absence of any adult members for
household listing purposes, absence of the eligible household member, or the latter’s
refusal or inability to participate.
All eligible household members were asked for consent at a local chief’s residence. This
guaranteed that each participant was aware of the identity of all other 15 participants
in her location, ensuring that each participant knew the average characteristics of her
anonymously assigned partner and that the same degree of anonymity was main-
tained for different rounds, independent of particpants’ houses’ relative locations to
each other. After consent, a short baseline survey was conducted. Enumerators then
delivered treatment specific game instructions one on one in subjects’ houses or at a
mutually agreeable place which guaranteed privacy.30
The participants were assigned to the same combination of treatments in all locations.
Enumerators rotated through instructing different treatments for each round, i.e. each
enumerator instructed four different treatments per day. The rotation scheme guaran-
teed that each enumerator collected sharing data for each treatment the same number
29Adults are individuals 18 years and above according to Malawi law.
30Both alternatives - group instruction sessions as well as treatment group instruction sessions
would have had considerable disadvantages compared to the method of instruction chosen. There
was a high chance of signalling between participants for both alternatives. In case of treatment group
instructions, there would have been a non-negligible opportunity for collusion, since all treatments
were played at each location, implying a maximum of 6 subjects instructed using the same script at
the same time. For group instruction sessions, on the other hand, the script would have needed to
comprise information about all treatment groups which reduced participants level of understanding
drastically as determined during piloting.
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of times over the course of the study.
Instructions were delivered orally. During instruction, the monetary consequences of
each potential sorting decision a player could make was demonstrated to her using
bottle caps31 and bags of beans. The consequences of several potential actions of the
other player, given an assumed rate of return, were illustratively demonstrated to her
in the same manner. At several pre-defined points, participants were allowed to ask
questions. If possible, the part of the instruction script that had remained unclear
to the participant was re-read, otherwise standardized answers were given. After a
final check for understanding upon completion of the script, all subjects were asked
to sort a standardized sample amount of beans, to get a clear idea of the difficulty
and duration of the task before making their (irreversible) sorting decisions.
After sorting, the enumerators contacted the supervisors to learn whether their par-
ticipant had been assigned the role of decision maker, and - for the monetary shock
treatments - whether their participant or the person matched with the participant or
both had lost their endowment. Neither information was revealed to the enumerators
ex ante, to not influence performance. After participants learned about their status,
non-decision makers were brought back to the chief’s residence where they completed
the opinion survey. Decision makers first had to make sharing decisions. The deci-
sion making process was aided in the following way: the monetary consequences of
the decision makers’ actions given her rate of return were reviewed and displayed in
front of her with bottle caps. Enumerators then demonstrated the consequences of
a possible effort/rate of return combination of the other player with bottle caps and
bags of beans given the sorting decision of (and associated outcome for) the dictator.
Next, the dictator was asked whether she wanted to keep more, equal, or less of the
31Bottle caps were turned upside down so that different colors would not lead to framing effects.
All bottle caps were white on the inside.
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common pot as compared to her counterpart. Afterwards, she was asked exactly how
much of the social surplus she would like to keep. If her answers were consistent, the
monetary consequences of her sharing decision were demonstrated with bottle caps
(otherwise, the enumerator would point out the inconsistency and ask the participant
how to correct it before proceeding). Importantly, the enumerators performed simple
algebra for the participants at this stage, summing up the distributional decisions in
terms of a) how much of the social surplus would be left for the other player, if the
decision maker’s choice was carried out, and b) calculating final amounts for both
players. Subjects were allowed to change their mind about their preferred allocation
once at this point, before the enumerator moved on to demonstrate the consequences
of another possible effort/rate of return combination of the matched player. This
two-step procedure allowed me to overcome educational limitations of parts of the
subject population which otherwise might have tainted results.
After all sharing decisions were made, the decision makers also returned to the chief’s
residence for completion of the opinion survey. Enumerators turned in the sheets on
which dictators’ and receivers’ decisions were recorded to the experimenter who then
matched these answer sheets according to a pre-specified matching scheme and paid
participants, calling them one by one to the project bus to keep payments private.
At the bus, during payment, they were informed about the payoff relevant sorting
and sharing decisions of their partner as well as their partner’s rate of return, as
mentioned in section 3. Baseline, game, and opinion survey together took approxi-
mately 1.5 hours on average, out of which less than 45 minutes were spent on game
instruction.
Data entry took place in Lilongwe, the capital of Malawi, by native Chichewa speaking
data entry staff (Chichewa being the language in which the project was conducted).
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I programmed the data entry forms in CSPro. Operators performed double entry for
all data.
1.5 Results
The analysis is based on the structural model of optimal choices of dictators described
in section 2. First, I present an empirical assessment of whether the norms postulated
in the model are appropriate for analyzing the allocation decisions in the data set.
After successfully establishing that subjects react as predicted to all variations for
which at least some norms predict changes of the optimal share, the analysis proceeds
with assigning observations and individuals to norms. First, I match observations with
norm predictions. I present frequencies and discuss the broad patterns of the results
before turning to more subtle analyses for those observations that do not match any
one norm prediction exactly. I then turn to individual level matching. Here, the issue
of self-consistency is discussed in addition to repeating the previous analyses. An OLS
analysis to identify demographic and socio-economic predictors for conformity with
specific norms follows. Last, I present OLS results for reduced form versions of the
model before turning to a mixed logit estimation.
1.5.1 Which Experimental Variations Do Subjects Respond To?
This sub-section assesses which experimental variations and which endogenous deci-
sions the subjects of this study responded to, in order to assess the appropriateness
of analyzing the data set with respect to the norms defined in the model section.
Specifically, I investigate whether and describe how the common pot shares that dic-
tators kept vary with effort, rate of return, and contribution size. I further determine
whether and how dictators take limited choice sets and shocks to personal endow-
ments into account when making decisions about the social surplus.
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The results are summarized in Table 3 − 7.32 Sample sizes are stated in terms of
individuals as well as in terms of observations. In addition to the mean and median
dictator share, the number and percentage of observations falling into each of four
categories is reported: purely selfish allocations, dictator shares between 100 and 50
percent of the common pot, equal splits of the social surplus, and “generous” alloca-
tions, for which the dictator share is lower than 50 percent of the total effort-generated
income.33 Based on these data, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests and nonparametric equality-
of-median tests allow me to assess which experimental variations are most relevant
for explaining the outcome data, thus building the foundation for a more detailed
analysis of the data in the following sub-sections.
1.5.1.1 Do Subjects Reward Effort?
The hypothesis that individuals reward both own and others’ effort is tested using
the data summarized in rows 2−4 of Table 3. To help the reader visualize the results
presented in the tables, the data is once more additionally displayed in histograms
(see Figures 9− 11) for this case.
Histogram 9 restricts the data to observations for which the dictator and receiver of
a team choose identical effort levels and have been assigned identical rates of return
(also see row 3 in Table 3). We see that the majority of decisions (63.5 percent) is
to keep exactly half of the common pot. Dictator shares between 100 and 50 percent
of the social surplus make for over a quarter of the observations. In comparison,
purely selfish and generous allocations are rare: they occur in just 6.6 percent and
32Note, that since the goal of this section is to understand whether and how subjects respond to
exogenous and endogenous variations of the experimental environment, rather than explicitly testing
model predictions, I restrict the data in various ways to isolate the respective effects. For example,
for analyzing whether subjects responded to income shocks, I restrict the data to observations for
which the rate of return and effort level between dictators and receivers is held constant.
33The usefulness of summarizing the data in these four categories is exemplified not only in Figure
8, but also in histograms 9− 11 (see sub-section 5.1.1).
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3.3 percent of all cases, respectively.34
Histogram 10 displays those cases in which the dictator has a higher effort level but
identical rate of return compared to the receiver (also see row 2 in Table 3). We
observe large shifts in the distribution towards higher dictator shares compared to
histogram 9, as would be intuitively expected for subjects who reward own effort.
Most strikingly, purely selfish allocations make up close to 40 percent of all observa-
tions now, while equal splits of the common pot occurred in only 25.5 percent of all
cases. A comparison of the location of the distributions summarized in rows 2 and
3 of Table 3 verifies that dictators keep a significantly higher share when they exert
more effort than matched receivers with the same rate of return, as compared to a
scenario in which both players exert the same effort at identical rates of return.
Histogram 11 restricts the data to observations for which the dictator has a lower
effort level than the receiver while both players have been assigned the same rate of
return (row 4 in Table 3). Again, we observe large, intuitive changes in the distribu-
tion compared to histogram 11. Especially striking is the marked increase in generous
allocations to 15.7 percent. Additionally, a smaller percentage of observations falls
into the categories in which the dictator takes more than 50 percent of the common
pot. The tests confirm that dictators, who at identical rates of return exert less effort
than matched receivers, keep a significantly smaller median share of the common pot.
Taken together, the evidence clearly suggests that dictators reward both own and
others’ effort. Therefore, it is appropriate to investigate whether individuals follow
34Note, that this supports the model’s assumption that individuals do not keep less than what their
preferred norms prescribe: For the cases described in histogram 9, only a sub-set of those dictators
who follow luck egalitarianism or the principle of equality of opportunity prefer generous allocations
(depending on the relative weight these individuals place on their own income). Therefore, we should
expect the majority of observations to not be generous.
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effort-based norms of distributional justice as postulated in the model section.
1.5.1.2 Do Subjects Reward Higher Rates of Return?
We explore the hypothesis that individuals reward a higher rate of return by analyz-
ing the data in rows 5, 6, and 7 of Table 3.
Rank-sum and equality-of-median tests comparing the location of the distribution of
dictator shares when dictators and receivers have identical effort levels and rates of
return to when they have identical effort levels but dictators are assigned a higher
rate of return (row 5 of Table 3), reveals that dictators increase their median share
significantly in the latter case. The opposite is not true if dictators have been as-
signed a lower rate of return than receivers (see row 7 of Table 3): differences turn
out insignificant.
Summing up, we can be confident that dictators generally do take rates of return into
account when making distributional choices. Therefore, it is sensible to investigate
whether individuals follow norms of distributive justice that take rates of return into
account as postulated in the model section.
1.5.1.3 Do Subjects Reward Higher Contributions?
We assess the hypothesis that individuals reward their own and others’ contributions
by analyzing the distributions summarized in rows 8 − 19 of Tables 3 and 4. The
data in rows 8 and 11 − 14 describe situations where the dictator contributes more
to the common pot than the receiver. The data in rows 10 and 16− 19 describe the
converse situations.
A comparison of the median shares for the distributions summarized in rows 8 and
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11 − 14 to the median share kept by dictators who contribute the same as receivers
reveals that individuals reward own contribution: shares kept by the dictators increase
significantly; in addition, dictators take the magnitude of the difference between their
own and others’ contribution level into account when determining payoffs - for the
maximum (minimum) difference in contribution between dictator and receiver the
highest (lowest) average dictator share of those in rows 11− 14 is kept. If the other
player’s contribution exceeds the dictator’s, we observe all previously described effects
in reverse, though of slightly smaller magnitudes. To sum up, both own and others’
contributions to the social surplus are clearly rewarded by dictators.
1.5.1.4 Do Subjects take Equality of Opportunity into Account?
In order to answer the question whether subjects take equality of opportunity into
account, I restrict the data to the treatments where at least one player was limited
in her effort choice, and compare these to the data for the benchmark treatment (for
which I exclude the observations of dictators, receivers or both players if they sorted 2
bags to ensure broad comparability to the various equality of opportunity treatments).
Tests on the data in rows 20 − 25 reveal that while the distributions of the dictator
shares for low rate of return dictators shift in the intuitively expected direction de-
pending on whose choice set is restricted, these changes in location are not strong
enough to be mirrored in the test statistics of either test.
This picture, however, changes when we investigate the sharing behavior of high rate
of return dictators in the context of effort caps: Row 27 shows the distribution of dic-
tator shares for all cases in which only the dictator was limited to sorting maximally
one bag. Comparing the median of this distribution to the median of the benchmark
treatment (excluding dictators who sorted more than one bag, i.e. row 26 of Table
28
4), we see that the share kept by the dictator is significantly higher if she has a re-
duced choice set, as would be intuitively expected for individuals taking equality of
opportunity into account.
Row 29 summarizes the distribution of dictator shares for those observations for which
only the receiver is limited to sorting maximally one bag. I compare the location of
this distribution to the location of the benchmark treatment excluding receivers who
sorted two bags, i.e. row 28. Here, the median share kept by the dictator is sig-
nificantly lower for the case in which the receiver faces an effort cap, as would be
expected if the principle of equality of opportunity influences decision making for the
analyzed sample.
Row 31, finally, displays the distribution of dictator shares for situations in which
both players faced an effort cap. A comparison of its location to the location of the
benchmark treatment (excluding dictators and receivers who sorted two bags, i.e. row
30 of Table 5) reveals no significant difference. Therefore, I conclude that the two
previous results are not in any significant way tainted by other effects but due to the
difference in opportunities between players. Therefore, the experimental data should
be analyzed for the principle of equality of opportunity.
1.5.1.5 Do Subjects care about Income Shocks unrelated to Productive
Activities?
In order to answer this question, we compare the data of the treatments in which at
least one of the players experienced a shock to their endowment, to the benchmark
treatment data. In all cases, I hold effort level constant between players.
The rank-sum and equality-of-median tests show that low and high rate of return
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dictators do not reimburse themselves for income shocks in a way that would show
up as significant in these simple location tests (see rows 32, 33 and 37, 38). At the
same time, test results are significant regarding reimbursement of receivers for such
shocks (see rows 33, 34 and 38, 39), independent of dictators’ rate of return.
A comparison between the treatment in which both players face an income shock, to
the benchmark treatment (see rows 35, 36 and 40, 41), reveals no significant difference
of the median share kept by the dictator independent of her rate of return. I therefore
conclude, that subjects truly respond to differences in non-effort-generated income.
It is thus sensible to include luck egalitarianism into the set of norms analyzed in this
paper.
1.5.2 Regression Analysis With Respect To Norm Predictions
In this subsection, I assess the average influence of effort, rates of return, contri-
butions, income shocks, and limited opportunities on monetary outcomes using the
entire sample for a reduced form regression analysis. While certain effects may not
come out as clearly in such an analysis (since they only concern a small sub-part of the
sample, such as one income shock treatment), the benefits of proceeding this way are
clear: In the previous sub-sections, I restricted the data in numerous ways in order to
hold all factors but the one of interest constant. Running an OLS allows me to look
at whether effects hold more generally without losing sample size while controlling for
other factors through inclusion of multiple dependent variables. Hence, this analysis
is able to deliver confirmation that absent to theory being imposed, effects hold with
(or despite) inclusion of controls. In other words, it provides a more comprehensive
picture of patterns found in the data relative to the previous subsection’s pairwise
comparisons, while theoretical specifications (which might obscure these patterns)
are absent and become relevant only for the structural estimation of the mixed logit
30
model of multinomial choice.
The outcome variable is the fraction of the common pot kept by the dictator. For
Table 8 and 9 I estimate the regression equations
yis = α + Visη + is (1.8)
and
yis = α + Tiγ + Visη + TiREisξ + is, (1.9)
where yis represents the fraction of the common pot that dictator i keeps for herself
in scenario s, where a scenario is a specific (hypothetical) effort/rate-of-return combi-
nation of the receiver. Vis is a matrix of scenario-dependent norm-relevant variables.
For different columns/specifications of Tables 8 and 9, it is either defined as (a) DEis,
a vector of (hypothetical) effort levels of the dictator, measured in number of bags
sorted, (b) REis, a vector of (hypothetical) effort levels of the receiver, measured in
number of bags sorted, (c) a vector of (hypothetical) differences in rates of return
between dictator and receiver, (d) a vector of (hypothetical) differences in dictator’s
and receiver’s contribution to the social surplus, measured in bottle caps, or (e) a
combination of the first three vectors.35 Ti is a vector of treatment group dummies.
For controls set to zero, dictators keep an average between 47.9 and 71.2 percent
of the common pot for themselves. These values are in line with findings of earlier
studies using dictator games to elicit sharing preferences in developing countries (see
Henrich et al. (2001)).
Dictators keep a significantly higher share of the common pot as their own effort
35Other combinations can not be included due to collinearity concerns.
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increases. In the specification of column 1 of Table 8, in which dictators keep an
average of 48 percent if their own effort is 0, dictators keep 9 percent more of the
(then increased) common pot as the receiver’s effort increases through sorting one
bag. Pooling data across treatments confirms therefore that subjects strongly reward
own effort.
Reversely, dictators keep a significantly lower share of the common pot as the re-
ceiver’s effort increases. In the specification of column 2 of Table 9, in which dictators
keep an average of 67.1 percent if the receiver’s effort is 0, dictators keep 12 percent
less of the (then increased) common pot as the receiver’s effort increases through sort-
ing one bag. Pooling data across treatments confirms therefore that subjects strongly
reward others’ effort.
Differences in rates of return can take the values −2, 0, or 2, subtracting the rate of
return of the receiver from that of the dictator. Dictators keep a significantly higher
average share when they have a higher rate of return, as intuitively expected. I in-
terpret this effect using the specification of column 3 of Table 8. Dictators keep an
average of 55 percent when both players have the same rate of return. If the dictator
has a higher rate of return than the receiver, she increases her average share by 6
percent. Interestingly, the average effect of the exogenously assigned rates of return
on the dictator’s share is smaller than that of effort.36
A positive difference in contributions, meaning that the dictator contributed more to
the social surplus than the receiver, leads to significantly higher average shares the
36Regarding comparability, please note that relative to situations in which both players have the
same rate of return, a change of one player’s rate of return causes a change in common pot size of
the same magnitude as can be achieved by either an increase or decrease of the effort level of one
of the players. Cases in which both players have effort levels of zero do not enter the analysis, since
no social surplus was to be shared.
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dictator allots to herself. The effect is slightly smaller when controls are added. 37
According to the specification of column 4, dictators keep an average of 57.4 percent
of the social surplus in cases where both players contribute the same amount to the
common pot, but increase their share by an additional 1.3 percent for each 40 MK
that their contribution exceeds that of the receiver.
Income shocks that the receiver alone is facing have highly significant effects indepen-
dent of the exact regression specification. The sign of the coefficients is as intuitively
expected: Dictators keep less of the social surplus when receivers lose part of their
endowment. However, income shocks that only the dictator faces have - on average -
no significant effects on shares. Finally, if both players face an income shock, we also
cannot observe any significant changes of average dictator shares. The OLS results
hence fully confirm the findings from the previous sub-sections, i.e. the picture cre-
ated by the analysis of the data summarized in Tables 3− 6 is matched by the OLS
regression results in all aspects.
Last, we look at the effects of reduced choice sets. It is most sensible to look at the
coefficients of the specification of column 10 since we can expect pure effort effects
being picked up in the other specifications. If we compare the coefficients of the three
treatments with effort caps we see that they are ordered in the way we would intu-
itively expect them to be, even though the effect of an effort cap of the dictator turns
out to be not significant.
Exclusion of baseline variables gives a similar picture for all effects. I conclude this
subsection by noting that we found clear evidence for the effects we would expect to
37The magnitude of the change of this point estimate across specifications is not different to the
one of the point estimate for receiver’s effort level. However, the former point estimate needs to
be multiplied by at least 4: the difference in contributions is measured in bottle caps, with 40 MK
being the minimal difference in contributions for players whose contributions do not coincide.
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see if subjects adhered to the norms proposed in section 2.
1.5.3 Matching the Experimental Data to Norm Predictions
The last subsection successfully established that subjects react as intuitively expected
to all variations for which at least some norms predict changes of the optimal share.
Therefore, I proceed by analyzing the data with respect to the principles of distribu-
tive justice specified in the model section.
1.5.3.1 Matching Observations to Norms
In order to categorize observations by norms, I proceed as follows. Initially, I calculate
the absolute difference between the share kept by a dictator in a specific allocation
and what each norm would predict for that particular scenario.38 If, for example,
a dictator kept all 80 MK of a common pot generated only by her partner’s effort,
the absolute difference to what strict egalitarianism would predict is 40 MK. I call
categorizations based on zero absolute differences “strong” matches.39 If individuals
care about income as well as norms of distributive justice, we should expect at least
some observations to be close to, but not at the point of prediction of any norm.
In such cases, I specify which norm(s) an observation is “closest to” by determin-
ing the smallest absolute difference(s) for the observation. Categorizations based on
minimal absolute difference are called “weak” matches for the remainder of the paper.
Strong Match There are multiple scenarios for which the predictions of different
norms are identical to each other, as was highlighted in the discussion of the inter-
pretation of the benchmark treatment outcomes (see sub-section 3.2). Therefore, I
38Although “selfishness” is not an actual norm of distributive justice, I do include the term in the
analysis for categorizing the data.
39Inequality aversion occasionally predicts amounts not divisible by 10 MK, (which is the smallest
monetary unit in this experiment - recall that subjects worked with bottle caps, where one bottle cap
represented 10 MK), but only by 5 MK. In such cases, if the dictator share is +/- 5 MK compared
to the prediction, it is treated as a zero absolute difference for the purpose of the analysis.
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distinguish between “unconditional” (see Table 10) and “exclusive” (see Table 11)
matches: the table of unconditional matches includes all observations that have been
categorized as conforming with the prediction of a particular norm. Take, f.ex., an
observation classified as libertarian: if the observation is an unconditional match it
might also fall into an additional category besides libertarianism. Exclusive matches,
on the other hand, are those for which an observed dictator share is exactly equal
only to the prediction of the norm(s) specified.
We see that among the unconditional matches 46.24 percent of all observations con-
form with strict egalitarianism and approximately a third with libertarianism and
liberal egalitarianism, respectively. Inequality aversion can be observed in 25.92 per-
cent of all cases. Less than 20 percent of all observations are purely selfish or cannot
be matched to any of the norms, respectively.40
Comparing exclusive to unconditional matches, the most striking difference is the
marked reduction of all norms with the exception of strict egalitarianism (see Table
11). We can observe, that even in cases in which strict egalitarianism predicts differ-
ent shares from all other norms, 21.66 percent of all observations can be classified as
strict egalitarian.
Weak Match Once again, we distinguish between unconditional and exclusive matches.
A comparison of weak to strong unconditional matches (Tables 12 and 10, respec-
tively) reveals that observations which could not be classified previously, are closest
to all norms other than inequality aversion: the percentage of observations which
can be matched with those norms increases by approximately 10 percent, while the
40Note, that the latter may well be in line with the model, since strong matches take neither the
balance between norm adherence and selfishness nor the balance between two (or more) competing
norms into account.
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percentage of observations which can be matched with inequality aversion increases
by 5.85 percent. Exclusive weak matches at the observation level (Table 13), show
only slight changes in percentages compared to Table 11.
The overall picture we gain from matching observations to norms is that while we ob-
serve high percentages of matches for all norms, only strict egalitarianism is frequently
followed if it predicts values different from those of other norms’ predictions.
1.5.3.2 Matching Individuals to Norms
In order to categorize individuals by norms, I first calculate the sums of the absolute
differences between the shares kept by a dictator (for all allocation decisions she had
to make) and what a specific norm would predict for each case. Second, I assign an
individual to a norm if the above described sum of absolute differences is zero for
the individual. I call categorizations based on a zero sum “strong” matches. Third, I
specify which norm(s) an individual is “closest to” by determining the smallest sum(s)
of absolute differences for the individual. I call categorizations based on minimal total
absolute difference “weak” matches.
Strong Match Looking at Table 14, we observe that 19.82 percent of individuals
are consistently acting according to strict egalitarianism, while 7.5 percent can be
classified as libertarian decision makers. 9 individuals act according to inequality
aversion and pure selfishness, respectively, while only 5 individuals consistently act
according to liberal egalitarianism. This picture does not change much if we look at
exclusive matches (see Table 15).
Weak Match As we can see in Table 16, over 50 percent of individuals are closest
to following strict egalitarianism across all of their decisions. Another 20.00 percent
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of individuals are closest to following inequality aversion, and 17.32 percent can be
classified as closest to being libertarian decision makers. 73 decision makers can be
classified as liberal egalitarian under weak matching.
The picture changes most drastically for strict egalitarianism and inequality aversion
under exclusive matching (see Table 17) as would be expected since the optimal shares
according to these norms can most easily coincide across different distributional de-
cisions: about 10 percent of individuals assigned to either of these norms are as close
to another norm.
The overall picture we gain from matching individuals to norms is that consistent
decision making in our sample occurs according to strict egalitarianism, inequality
aversion, libertarianism, and liberal egalitarianism, noted in the order of influence.
Pure selfishness clearly also plays a role when describing self-consistent behavior of
the experimental subjects.
Taking observation level and individual level matching results together, we conclude
that a surprisingly large percentage of observations/individuals strictly follows only
one of the norms postulated. However, the majority of individuals optimizes dif-
ferently, which, taken together with the fact that experimental subjects do react as
intuitively expected to experimental variations, points to the appropriateness of es-
timating a mixed logit choice model, which will allow subjects to follow a weighted
sum of pure selfishness and multiple norms.
Before that, I carry out a simple analysis to determine whether demographic or socio-
economic variables serve as predictors for following particular norms as identified
above.
37
1.5.3.3 Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Norm-Abiding
Behavior
This subsection analyzes whether the matching outcomes at either the observation
or individual level are influenced by demographic or socio-economic characteristics
(see Tables 18 and 19). Presented are strong and weak unconditional matches on the
observation level.41
The magnitudes of the coefficients seem small overall. Yet, we observe some strikingly
intuitive results: Individuals from richer households, as measured by the household
asset index, are significantly less likely to act strict egalitarian and significantly more
likely to not follow any of the other norms exactly (i.e. to fall into the category
“other”).42 Being more educated is a predictor for a higher likelihood of acting in
line with any norm, i.e. subjects who are more educated adhere more strictly to
norms. Interestingly, and contrary to results from regular dictator games, a higher
age seems to predict a lower likelihood of strict egalitarian behavior. To understand
the intuition, recall that the effort task employed in this study was sorting beans,
a task for which a minority among the elderly had to exert higher effort than the
average study participant due to limited mobility of their fingers.43 Hence, it makes
sense that these individuals would be less likely to act strict egalitarian.
In summary, we can draw the conclusion that demographic and socio-economic vari-
ables have very limited explanatory power for the outcomes of this study, though
they are overall intuitive. Instead, outcomes vary predominantly with exogenous and
endogenous variations of the experimental environment.
41Results for exclusive matches give the same overall picture and are available from the author
upon request, individual level results can be found in the appendix.
42This observation is in line with these individuals weighting between selfishness and other norms.
43In addition, it may be that those individuals also perceived attendance at the common meeting
point to entail more effort, if walking proved difficult for them.
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1.5.4 Mixed Logit
The subjects of the experiment who are assigned the role of dictator by the ran-
domization process are assumed to be self-interested but also concerned with several
different fairness ideals. Looking at the results of a mixed logit estimation (see Table
20) of the model proposed in section 2, we see strongly significant effects of all norms
on decision making, with strict egalitarianism having the largest weight, independent
of whether the specification includes all norms or we compare the coefficients of the
specifications in which only one norm is included at a time. The relative importance
of liberal egalitarianism and libertarianism does not change across these two types of
specifications, contrary to that of inequality aversion in relation to the other norms:
If inequality aversion is included by itself it increases the probability for a specific
choice more than libertarian or liberal egalitarian concerns (see the fourth column,
Table 20). However, when included together with strict egalitarianism, many obser-
vations are attributed to an influence of the latter, implying that inequality aversion
drops in influence on decision making to last place among the norms (see the fifth
column, Table 20, in comparison). Not surprisingly, own interest (i.e. pure income
considerations) is highly significant for decision making, independent of which norms
are included (though its effect on dictators’ choices seems rather small in comparison
to that of the fairness considerations).
As a robustness check, I estimate McFadden’s Choice Model, which is closest to
the mixed logit except that it estimates fixed coefficients rather than a distribution
of the latter. Results are very similar in nature (see Table 21). The only notable
difference lies in the relative importance of liberal egalitarianism and libertarianism
for choices, which, when both norms are included in the same regression, turns out to
be opposite in this analysis to what the mixed logit stated. However, the difference
in relative importance is not particularly striking, since both norms’ influence is
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roughly comparable and both estimation results are approximately in line with the
matching exercise presented in earlier sub-sections. Most importantly, the relatively
large influence of strict egalitarianism on decision making seems confirmed. Hence,
we can be assured that results are not just an artefact of the estimation method
employed, but that broad patterns can be confirmed independent of exact estimation
strategy.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the importance of several frequently discussed norms of distributive
justice - strict egalitarianism, inequality aversion, luck egalitarianism, the principle
of equality of opportunity, libertarianism, and liberal egalitarianism - in rural com-
munities of Malawi. To this end, a lab-in-the-field experiment in form of a one-shot
two-person dictator game with production stage is employed. The outcomes of the
experiment reveal how effort-generated income is shared between individuals who may
differ with respect to rate of return, effort, opportunity, or endowments.
The evidence clearly suggests that dictators are not only motivated by concerns about
their own incomes but take into account several factors when making distributional
choices. Behavior according to contribution based and effort based norms is widely
observable, even though equality based norms have the largest influence on individu-
als’ sharing behavior. Moreover, individuals take equality of opportunity and income
shocks, which are unrelated to productive activities, into account when distribut-
ing social surplus. Socio-economic and demographic variables have little explanatory
power regarding norm adherence. These findings together with the estimation of the
structural model suggest that a complete model of distributional choice for a devel-
oping country context should take all of these norms into account.
40
The relatively large influence of strict egalitarianism and inequality aversion on deci-
sion making seems to be in line with critical voices claiming that norms may disincen-
tivize productive activities in places like Malawi. However, three facts render doubt
on whether norms truly play a significant role in lack of development: (1) the fact
that effort is rewarded strongly on average, (2) the fact that a multitude of factors
is taken into account when making sharing decisions, and (3) the fact that even in
developed societies strict egalitarianism seems to be the prevailing norm. For a more
meaningful judgment, the interaction between norms and institutions is crucial and
will be explored in future work.
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1.1: Timing of Experimental Procedures
Figure 1.2: Timing of Field-Experimental Procedures
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Figure 1.3: Libertarianism
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Figure 1.4: Strict Egalitarianism and Selfishness
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Figure 1.5: Liberal Egalitarianism; ai = 1, aj = 2
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Figure 1.6: Inequality Aversion; ai = 1, aj = 2
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Figure 1.7: Inequality Aversion with ai = 1 and aj = 2 for the Benchmark Treatment
and both Asymmetric Income Shock Treatments
45
Figure 1.8: Shares of Common Pot Kept by Dictators (Strategy Method)
Figure 1.9: Shares of Common Pot Kept by Dictators for Dictators and Receivers
Who Have Identical Effort Levels and Rates of Return (Strategy Method)
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Figure 1.10: Shares of Common Pot Kept by Dictators for Dictators Who Exerted
More Effort than Matched Receivers, but Have an Identical Rate of
Return (Strategy Method)
Figure 1.11: Shares of Common Pot Kept by Dictators for Dictators Who Exerted
Less Effort than Matched Receivers, but Have an Identical Rate of Re-
turn (Strategy Method)
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1.8 Tables
Effort Generated Income From Non-Effort-Generated-
Sorting (Contribution to Common Income From Returning
Pot) Unsorted Bags
Number of Bags Sorted Low Rate of Return / Low and High Rate of Return
High Rate of Return
2 80 MK / 160 MK 0 MK
1 40 MK / 80 MK 20 MK
0 0 MK / 0 MK 40 MK
Table 1.1: Generated Income; Benchmark Treatment, Equality of Opportunity Treat-
ments without Effort Cap and Income Shock Treatments (Monetary En-
dowment of 30 MK; 0 MK in Case of Income Shock)
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Effort Generated Income From Non-Effort-Generated-
Sorting (Contribution to Common Income From Returning
Pot) Unsorted Bags
Number of Bags Sorted Low Rate of Return / Low and High Rate of Return
High Rate of Return
1 40 MK / 80 MK 0 MK
0 0 MK / 0 MK 20 MK
Table 1.2: Generated Income; Equality of Opportunity Treatments with Effort Cap
(Monetary Endowment of 50 MK)
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Data Description A B C D E F G H
1 All Observations 560 2751 65.1 50.0 19.7 28.0 46.2 6.1
2 Dictators Exerted More Effort Than
Matched Receivers, Both Players
Have Identical Rates of Return 416 552 77.9 75.0(†,†) 39.3 34.7 25.5 0.5
3 Both Dictator and Receiver Have
Identical Effort Levels and
Rates of Return 397 397 58.8 50.0* 6.6 26.6 63.5 3.3
4 Dictators Exerted Less Effort Than
Matched Receivers, Both Players
Have Identical Rate of Return 324 427 54.4 50.0(†,‡) 6.8 18.7 58.8 15.7
5 Dictator Has Higher Rate of
Return, Both Players Exerted
Same Effort Level 184 184 63.7 66.7(†,†) 6.5 51.1 41.3 1.1
6 Both Dictator and Receiver Have
Identical Effort Levels and
Rates of Return 397 397 58.8 50.0* 6.6 26.6 63.5 3.3
7 Dictator Has Lower Rate of
Return, Both Players Exerted
Same Effort Level 213 213 57.5 50.0(§,§) 6.6 27.7 55.4 10.3
8 Dictators Contribute More
to the Common Pot 416 1214 76.0 75.0(†,†) 35.4 35.4 28.5 0.7
9 Dictator and Receiver Contribute
the Same to the Common Pot 408 556 59.1 50.0* 6.7 28.0 61.7 3.6
10 Dictators Contribute Less
to the Common Pot 442 981 55.0 50.0(†,†) 7.7 18.8 59.4 14.1
11 Dictator Contributes 160 MK More
to Common Pot than Receiver 62 124 85.3 100.0(†,†) 61.3 19.3 19.4 0
12 Dictator Contributes 120 MK More
to Common Pot than Receiver 62 62 74.8 80.0(†,†) 9.7 69.3 21.0 0
13 Dictator Contributes 80 MK More
to Common Pot than Receiver 266 524 76.8 75.0(†,†) 36.3 36.5 26.0 1.2
14 Dictator Contributes 40 MK More
to Common Pot than Receiver 354 504 73.1 75.0(†,†) 31.4 33.7 34.3 0.6
15 Dictator and Receiver Contribute
the Same to the Common Pot 408 556 59.1 50.0* 6.7 28.0 61.7 3.6
Table 1.3: Dictator Shares (Strategy Method)
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Data Description A B C D E F G H
16 Dictator Contributes 40 MK Less
to Common Pot than Receiver 294 389 56.7 50.0(†,†) 9.0 20.6 59.6 10.8
17 Dictator Contributes 80 MK Less
to Common Pot than Receiver 292 394 54.0 50.0(†,†) 6.1 18.6 59.1 16.2
18 Dictator Contributes 120 MK Less
to Common Pot than Receiver 95 95 54.8 50.0(†,†) 8.4 20.1 56.8 14.7
19 Dictator Contributes 160 MK Less
to Common Pot than Receiver 103 103 52.2 50.0(†,†) 7.8 12.6 62.1 17.5
20 Benchmark Treatment-Excluding
Dictators Sorting 2 Bags (for
Dictators with Low Rate
of Return) 29 150 60.5 50.0* 16.0 21.3 56.0 6.7
21 Dictator Faces Reduced Choice
Set (for Dictators with
Low Rate of Return) 46 243 62.4 50.0(§,§) 17.7 24.7 46.5 11.1
22 Benchmark Treatment-Excluding
Receivers Sorting 2 Bags (for
Dictators with Low Rate
of Return) 44 152 69.9 62.5* 28.3 29.6 40.1 2.0
23 Receiver Faces Reduced Choice
Set (for Dictators with
Low Rate of Return) 44 158 67.2 64.2(§,§) 21.5 28.5 46.2 3.8
24 Benchmark Treatment-Excluding
Dictators and Receivers Sorting
2 Bags (for Dictators with
Low Rate of Return) 29 92 64.8 50.0* 21.7 21.7 53.3 3.3
25 Both Players Face Reduced Choice
Set (for Dictators with
Low Rate of Return) 44 150 66.2 50.0(§,§) 24.0 23.3 46.0 6.7
26 Benchmark Treatment-Excluding
Dictators Sorting 2 Bags (for
Dictators with High Rate
of Return) 18 90 57.2 50.0* 16.7 14.4 53.3 15.6
Table 1.4: Dictator Shares (Strategy Method) (continued from previous page)
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Data Description A B C D E F G H
27 Dictator Faces Reduced Choice
Set (for Dictators with
High Rate of Return) 34 176 65.6 50.0(‡,‡) 19.3 26.7 44.9 9.1
28 Benchmark Treatment-Excluding
Receivers Sorting 2 Bags (for
Dictators with High Rate
of Return) 36 126 74.4 75.0* 34.9 32.5 27.8 4.8
29 Receiver Faces Reduced Choice
Set (for Dictators with
High Rate of Return) 36 126 68.5 62.5(‡,‡) 20.3 36.8 39.7 3.2
30 Benchmark Treatment-Excluding
Dictators and Receivers
Sorting 2 Bags (for
Dictators with High Rate
of Return) 18 54 62.7 50.0* 22.2 20.4 46.3 11.1
31 Both Players Face Reduced
Choice Set (for Dictators with
High Rate of Return) 36 124 68.0 62.5(§,§) 21.0 34.7 40.3 4.0
32 Dictator Faces Income
Shock (for Dictators with
Low Rate of Return) 43 236 68.0 60.4(§,§) 23.7 28.8 42.4 5.1
33 Benchmark Treatment (for
Dictators with Low Rate of
Return) 44 240 64.8 50.0* 20.8 26.7 47.5 5.0
34 Receiver Faces Income
Shock (for Dictators with
Low Rate of Return) 43 232 59.3 50.0(†,†) 16.8 13.8 61.2 8.2
35 Benchmark Treatment (for
Dictators with Low Rate of
Return) 44 240 64.8 50.0* 20.8 26.7 47.5 5.0
36 Both Players Face Income
Shock (for Dictators with
Low Rate of Return) 42 236 65.0 50.0(§,§) 21.2 24.6 50.0 4.2
Table 1.5: Dictator Shares (Strategy Method) (continued from previous page)
52
Data Description A B C D E F G H
37 Dictator Faces Income
Shock (for Dictators with
High Rate of Return) 37 202 66.8 62.5(§,§) 16.8 40.1 37.6 5.5
38 Benchmark Treatment (for
Dictators with High Rate of
Return) 36 198 67.6 62.5* 23.7 31.8 36.9 7.6
39 Receiver Faces Income
Shock (for Dictators with
High Rate of Return) 36 206 61.2 50.0(†,†) 13.1 25.2 56.8 4.9
40 Benchmark Treatment (for
Dictators with High Rate of
Return) 36 198 67.6 62.5* 23.7 31.8 36.9 7.6
41 Both Players Face Income
Shock (for Dictators with
High Rate of Return) 39 224 65.1 58.3(§,§) 17.9 33.8 43.8 4.5
Table 1.6: Dictator Shares (Strategy Method) (continued from previous page)
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A Number of Individuals
B Number of Observations
C Mean Share of Common Pot Kept by Dictators
D Median Share of Common Pot Kept by Dictators
E Share of Common Pot Kept by Dictator is 100 (in Percent)
F Share of Common Pot Kept by Dictator is Between 50 and 100 (in Percent)
G Share of Common Pot Kept by Dictator is 50 (in Percent)
H Share of Common Pot Kept by Dictator is Less Than 50 (in Percent)
* Benchmark Group
§ Not Significantly Different from Benchmark Group
‡ Significantly Different from Benchmark Group at 5 percent
† Significantly Different from Benchmark Group at 1 percent
First Superscript Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test Results
Second Superscript Nonparametric Equality-of-Median Test Results
Table 1.7: Dictator Shares (Strategy Method) (continued from previous page)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dictator’s Effort (Measured 0.090*** 0.069***
in Bags Sorted) (0.006) (0.006)
Receiver’s Effort (Measured -0.120*** -0.110***
in Bags Sorted) (0.005) (0.005)
Difference in Rates 0.06*** 0.006***
of Return (0.003) (0.003)
Differences in
Contributions (Measured 0.013***
in Bottle Caps) (0.001)
Constant 0.480*** 0.671*** 0.550*** 0.574*** 0.609***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)
No. of Obs. 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537
R2 0.09 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.25
Demographic and Socio-
Economic Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Table 1.8: Regressions of Dictator Shares on Model Variables with Baseline Variables.
* Significant at 10 Percent; ** Significant at 5 Percent; *** Significant at
1 Percent
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(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dictator’s Effort (Measured 0.098*** 0.072***
in Bags Sorted) (0.006) (0.006)
Receiver’s Effort (Measured -0.125*** -0.114***
in Bags Sorted) (0.005) (0.005)
Difference in Rates 0.006*** 0.006***
of Return (0.003) (0.003)
Differences in
Contributions (Measured 0.013***
in Bottle Caps) (0.001)
Effort Cap (Receiver) 0.017 -0.059*** 0.007 -0.026* -0.046***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Effort Cap (Dictator) 0.021 -0.024* -0.030* 0.015 0.013
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Effort Cap (Both 0.041** -0.063*** 0.001 -0.009 -0.028*
Players) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016)
Income Shock -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.062***
(Receiver) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Income Shock (Dictator) 0.013 0.009 0.01 0.009 0.01
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Income Shock (Both -0.014 -0.013 -0.008 -0.022 -0.019
Players) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 0.479*** 0.712*** 0.571*** 0.594*** 0.634***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
No. of Obs. 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537
R2 0.11 0.22 0.03 0.22 0.26
Demographic and Socio-
Economic Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Table 1.9: Regressions of Dictator Shares on Model Variables with Baseline Variables
(continued from previous page). * Significant at 10 Percent; ** Significant
at 5 Percent; *** Significant at 1 Percent
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1.8.1 Tables of Norms at Observation Level for Strong Match
NObs Percent
Strict Egalitarianism 1272 46.24
Libertarianism 917 33.33
Liberal Egalitarianism 931 33.84
Inequity Aversion 713 25.92
Selfishness 542 19.70
Other 549 19.96
Total 2751
Table 1.10: Unconditional Matches of Preferences to Norms
NObs Percent
Strict Egalitarianism 596 21.66
Libertarianism 85 3.09
Liberal Egalitarianism 11 0.40
Inequity Aversion 194 7.05
Selfishness 146 5.31
Other 1719 62.49
Total 2751
Table 1.11: Exclusive Matches of Preferences to Norms
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1.8.2 Tables of Norms at Observation Level for Weak Match
NObs Percent
Strict Egalitarianism 1577 57.32
Libertarianism 1159 42.13
Liberal Egalitarianism 1182 42.97
Inequity Aversion 874 31.77
Selfishness 803 29.19
Other N.A. N.A.
Total 2751
Table 1.12: Unconditional Matches of Preferences to Norms
NObs Percent
Strict Egalitarianism 738 26.83
Libertarianism 106 3.85
Liberal Egalitarianism 18 0.65
Inequity Aversion 256 9.31
Selfishness 221 8.03
Other 1412 51.33
Total 2751
Table 1.13: Exclusive Matches of Preferences to Norms
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1.8.3 Tables of Norms at Person Level for Strong Match
NObs Percent
Strict Egalitarianism 111 19.82
Libertarianism 42 7.50
Liberal Egalitarianism 5 0.89
Inequity Aversion 9 1.61
Selfishness 9 1.61
Other 385 68.75
Total 560
Table 1.14: Unconditional Matches of Preferences to Norms
NObs Percent
Strict Egalitarianism 111 19.82
Libertarianism 41 7.32
Liberal Egalitarianism 4 0.71
Inequity Aversion 9 1.61
Selfishness 9 1.61
Other 386 68.93
Total 560
Table 1.15: Exclusive Matches of Preferences to Norms
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1.8.4 Tables of Norms at Person Level for Weak Match
NObs Percent
Strict Egalitarianism 299 53.39
Libertarianism 97 17.32
Liberal Egalitarianism 73 13.04
Inequity Aversion 112 20.00
Selfishness 66 11.79
Other N.A. N.A.
Total 560
Table 1.16: Unconditional Matches of Preferences to Norms
NObs Percent
Strict Egalitarianism 246 43.93
Libertarianism 77 13.75
Liberal Egalitarianism 45 8.04
Inequity Aversion 53 9.46
Selfishness 58 10.36
Other 81 14.46
Total 560
Table 1.17: Exclusive Matches of Preferences to Norms
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1.8.5 Observation Level Regressions
SE L LE IA S
Female 0.013 -0.076*** -0.085*** 0.000 -0.006
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025)
Age -0.014*** 0.009*** 0.007** -0.001 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age Squared 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of Education 0.006* -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.009***
Completed (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Head of Household -0.005 -0.034 -0.035 0.019 -0.052**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025)
No. of Children Who Grew -0.006 0.005 0.007* 0.001 0.004
Up in Household Together (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
No. of Children 0.010* 0.002 -0.001 0.008 -0.019***
in Current Household (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Household Asset Index -0.016*** 0.009 0.006 -0.004 0.015***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Household Animal 0.010 -0.030*** -0.026*** 0.001 -0.009
Ownership Index (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.57 0.42 0.43 0.32 0.29
N 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
Table 1.18: Regression of Weak Match Unconditional Dummies on Baseline Variables.
* Significant at 10 Percent, ** Significant at 5 Percent, *** Significant at
1 Percent
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SE L LE IA S O
Female -0.007 -0.062** -0.064** 0.004 0.001 0.007
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
Age -0.014*** 0.009*** 0.007** -0.007** 0.009*** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age Squared 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of Education 0.006* 0.004 0.005* 0.006** -0.003 -0.007**
Completed (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Head of Household 0.037 0.007 0.001 0.058** -0.014 -0.068***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
No. of Children Who Grew -0.005 0.006 0.007* -0.001 0.006* -0.005
Up in Household Together (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
No. of Children 0.012** 0.001 -0.001 0.012** -0.013*** -0.004
in Current Household (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Household Asset Index -0.022*** 0.003 0.000 -0.008 0.004 0.014***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Household Animal 0.010 -0.018** -0.013 0.002 -0.001 -0.004
Ownership Index (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.46 0.33 0.34 0.26 0.20 0.20
N 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537
R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Table 1.19: Regression of Strong Match Unconditional Dummies on Baseline Vari-
ables. * Significant at 10 Percent, ** Significant at 5 Percent, *** Signif-
icant at 1 Percent
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SE LE L IA SE, LE, L, IA
Mean
y 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SE Loss Term 0.48*** 0.55***
(0.03) (0.04)
LE Loss Term 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.00) (0.02)
L Loss Term 0.11*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.02)
IA Loss Term 0.24*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.02)
SD
SE Loss Term 0.51*** 0.85***
(0.04) (0.05)
LE Loss Term 0.08*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
L Loss Term 0.08*** -0.19***
(0.01) (0.01)
IA Loss Term 0.17*** -0.13***
(0.01) (0.02)
Log Likelihood -5541.66 -5875.84 -5919.72 -5706.79 -4916.95
Number of
Observations 36815 36815 36815 36815 36815
LRChi2 1121.41*** 247.74*** 217.63*** 398.58*** 1645.01***
Table 1.20: Mixed Logit Estimation. * Significant at 10 Percent, ** Significant at 5
Percent, *** Significant at 1 Percent
63
SE LE L IA SE, LE, L, IA
y 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SE Loss Term 0.15*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01)
LE Loss Term 0.08*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.01)
L Loss Term 0.08*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.01)
IA Loss Term 0.14*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.01)
Log Likelihood -6102.37 -5999.71 -6028.54 -5906.08 -5754.51
Number of
Observations 36815 36815 36815 36815 36815
Number of Cases 2751 2751 2751 2751 2751
WaldChi2 719.47*** 844.16*** 827.30*** 862.59*** 918.14***
Table 1.21: McFadden’s Choice Model. * Significant at 10 Percent, ** Significant at
5 Percent, *** Significant at 1 Percent
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CHAPTER II
Are Rural Road Investments Alone Sufficient to
Generate Transport Flows?
2.1 Introduction
This paper draws lessons from a randomized experiment in rural Malawi, which has
one of the highest population densities for a Sub-Saharan Africa country.1 In order to
understand why rural roads - passable for vehicles in rural areas - may not necessarily
lead to the provision of regular bus services, a minibus service was subsidized over a
six month period over a distance of 20 kilometres to serve five villages.2
Like Hine and Rutter (2000) mentioned, “in the quest to tackle rural poverty, feeder
road investment is a favored solution of many donors”. Feeder roads are proposed as
a potential way to take people out for poverty in rural areas (AICD 2009). With this
end in view, a benchmark called the rural access index (RAI), which is the proportion
of rural people who live within two kilometers (typically equivalent to a 20-minute
walk) of an all-season road, has been set.3
1According to official population estimates in 2002, population density was more than 90 inhab-
itants per sq.km.
2This location was selected in order to make multiple trips per day, and given that the road was
not in a very good condition, there was a need to be close enough to the market center.
3An all-season road is a (gravel or bitumen paved) road that is passable all year by the pre-
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Measuring the cost of being isolated is a growing subject of research in economics and
development. Ravallion and Jalan (1997) confirmed the existence of spatial poverty
traps and the need for households to reach some asset thresholds before they will
participate in markets. Therefore, rural roads investments seem to be critical. In-
deed, rural road development enhances access to markets for both inputs and output
through a reduction in transaction and trade costs (transport and logistics costs).
The greater availability (both monetary and physically speaking) of inputs increases
their use by farmers. Consequently, agricultural productivity can increase. Rural
roads also allow producers to achieve additional productive opportunities, leading to
a rise in production that is highlighted by numerous studies. Stifel and Minten (2008)
find, in the case of Madagascar, that isolation (defined as travel time during dry sea-
son from the commune center to the nearest urban center) implies lower agricultural
productivity, increased transport and transaction costs and increased insecurity. The
authors found a major jump of per capita consumption from the least remote quintile
to the second quintile and therefore a negative relationship between isolation and
poverty.4
So far, most Development Partners and governments in SSA have mainly relied on
the assumption that most households in rural areas in Africa are not connected to
markets by paved or passable roads for motorized transport and therefore need a road
passable for a truck/bus. Many investments in rural roads seem to be built on the
assumption that they will lead to market provision of transport and thus, poverty re-
duction and income generation. Estache (2010) points out a lack of rigorous evidence
vailing means of rural transport (often a pick-up or a truck which does not have four-wheel-drive).
Predictable interruptions of short duration during inclement weather (e.g. heavy rainfall) are ac-
ceptable, particularly on low volume roads (Raballand et al. 2010). Despite major measurement
difficulties of the RAI, it is required for World Bank project teams to report it on a bi-annual basis
and assess the number of people covered at 2 kilometers in the project area.
4Quoted in Raballand et al. (2010).
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on these assumptions; namely there is a lack of randomized impact evaluations in the
field of investments in roads, which call into question these assumptions and limit the
ability to quantify the economic and even social benefits of the provision of rural roads.
In fact, there is some empirical evidence that calls into question current transportation
strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using the second Cameroonian national household
survey (Enqueˆte Camerounaise Aupre`s des Me´nages II, 2001) and the Cameroon case
study, Gachassin et al. (2010) demonstrate that investing in tarmac roads is likely to
have a low impact on poverty. For example, isolation from a tarred road is found to
have no direct impact on consumption expenditures in Cameroon. The paper reasserts
the fact that access to roads is only one factor contributing to poverty reduction (and
not necessarily the most important). Considering that increase in non-farming ac-
tivities is the main driver for poverty reduction in rural Africa, the authors suggest
that emphasis on roads investments should be given to locations where non-farming
activities could be developed, which does mean that the last mile in rural areas should
not be probably a road with a high road level of service (except in peculiar cases of
high agricultural potential areas).
One of the main weaknesses of the current approach regarding road investments is the
fact that it is built on the strong assumption among policy makers that the existence
of a road in good condition in rural areas will enable service providers to come and
serve rural areas. In most cases, transport services economics is completely neglected,
assuming that road condition is the main determinant of transport costs.
A notable exception was Hine and Rutter (2000), who, based on surveys in almost
100 villages in Ghana and Malawi in the end of the 1990s, found out that “vehicle
accessibility alone does not guarantee [...] transport service access”. Moreover, Lall
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(2009), which, in the case of Malawi, demonstrated that, based on trucking surveys
and computation of vehicle operating costs in SSA, that both infrastructure quality
and market structure of the trucking industry are important contributors to differ-
ences in transport costs. Lall (2009) points out that costs due to poor feeder roads
are exacerbated by low volumes of trade between rural locations and market centers.
With empty backhauls and journeys covering small distances, only a few transport
service providers enter the market, charging high prices to cover fixed costs and max-
imize markups.
Raballand et al. (2010) finds in field surveys in Uganda, Cameroon and Burkina Faso
that load consolidation at the local level decreases the need for a road accessible by
truck to every farm and it decreases investment needs and increases value-added for
farmers. From a cost-benefit analysis, load consolidation (or agglomeration) is proba-
bly the most effective since it mainly reduces road public investment to the secondary
network and enables decrease of transport costs due to increased predictability of vol-
umes and strengthened competition between operators.
In the case of this paper, through a randomized evaluation, a passenger bus line was
introduced between a rural cluster of villages and a town that serves as a regional
trading hub. The study was implemented in rural Malawi, more than two hours
by car from the nearest urban location. While most residents of the villages had
been to the regional market town (96 percent) and most had been a passenger on a
bus prior to the project (81 percent), no regular motorized passenger transportation
existed along the road between the market town and the project villages prior to
this study. Prior to this study, travel outside of the village cluster was infrequent
and most transport was pedestrian or by bicycle. This particular market town offers
dozens of stores providing domestic goods and agricultural inputs. There is also a
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weekly market in the town that brings traders from disparate areas to sell their goods.
In the study, after a baseline survey, households were randomly assigned to one of
seven bus pass categories, with each category assigned a unique price between zero
and five hundred Malawi Kwacha (US$ 3.57). Over the course of the project, take
up of the bus was recorded (See Goldberg et al., 2010 for a full set of results).
There were significant differences in take up based on the price level assigned to a
household. Even small positive prices (far below the marginal cost of a ride) lead to
substantial declines in demand for a bus ride.5
The experiment demonstrates that households from villages are not willing or cannot
afford to pay more than the break-even point for the bus operator.6 There are two
important policy implications of these findings. First, if a bus service is not subsi-
dized, a road in relatively good condition may continue to be used mainly by bicycles
and pedestrians. Second, if subsidies are not possible in most rural areas in Malawi
(or more generally in SSA), there may be a need to adjust more carefully investments
to the potential demand and link it to the types of services provision used in the areas.
The second section describes the experiment protocol and data. Then, results are
presented in terms of take up and potential revenues for a bus operator at different
prices. The fourth section discusses the policy implications of the results and the final
section concludes and presents some ideas for future research in this area.
5This concurs with findings from Hine and Rutter (2000), who found out that, for these reasons
of affordability of transport services, the poorest segment of rural areas populations continue to walk
and do not necessarily benefit from rural roads investments.
6Results could have differed if the experiment would have been longer (over a year). However,
we also think that results over six months are significant.
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2.2 Description of the data and experiment
The study was conducted between the July and December 2009 in a rural area in cen-
tral Malawi. The sample site includes a cluster of five villages located 17 kilometers
from a market town which offers a large weekly market, a health clinic, and access to
further means of transport. In total, 542 households were listed in the five villages (in
a complete census). A circular circuit track connects three of the five villages, with
the other two villages within 10 minutes walking distance. This track was identified
to serve as the bus route to use in picking up passengers. While there is some evidence
of irregular transport on the road between the village cluster and the market town,
there was no evidence of a bus or any other mode of transport intended for passen-
gers that operated along the road connecting the village cluster and the market town.7
We report on the second phase of a two part design.8 Of the originally listed 542
households, 514 households were successfully interviewed and were eligible to partici-
pate; 406 of these households are included in the second phase analysis. Participation
in phase one and phase two was by random assignment. After selection, a baseline
survey was conducted interviewing both men and women. After the completion of
the baseline survey, a meeting was called at each of the five villages. At the meeting,
a household-level lottery was explained. One member of each household was asked
to select a ticket from a bucket. Each ticket contained a number to signify the price
of one round trip on the project bus. Prices of a round trip included the following
categories: MK 0, MK 10, MK 20, MK 50, MK 100, MK 300, MK 500.9 After the
household member was assigned the lottery ticket, the number was recorded and the
7This road was identified as in a good condition for buses to run (during the dry season).
8The first Phase included conducting a listing of all households in the village cluster area and
randomly sampling 100 households in four villages to participate in the first phase of the project
which did not randomize the price, rather randomized overall accessibility.
9All households that participated in the first phase (randomly selected) were allocated MK 0.
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price was stamped on a bus pass unique to that household.10 Bus ridership records
were kept by a supervising member of the field team and we report on these here.
In addition to collecting data on individuals and households, we also conducted in-
depth interviews among minibus owners and drivers, of which two were providing bus
services to the market town (not from the cluster of villages included in this study).
Minibus owners and drivers near the market town were interviewed in order obtain a
broader understanding of the market for transportation in Ntchisi district.
2.3 Results
Results are presented in two parts: the first one relates to the take-up of the bus and
presents what is the affordability level in this area and bus use when it is subsidized.
The second part tries to assess if there is any price level, at which the bus provider
would recover operational costs and then make private bus provision a viable option
for transport firms.
2.3.1 Take-up of the bus service
At the household level, more that 60 percent of households used the bus at least
once with an average of 2.85 inbound rides. We focus on individual take-up in Figure
1. This figure presents proportion of individuals who used the bus at least once by
randomly assigned price. There is a sharp decrease in ridership among those required
to pay a positive price, especially prices above 100 Kwacha. These results are similar
among men and women (not shown).
10One bus pass was valid for all adult members of that household. The bus pass contained a photo
and name of the adult members of the pass holder’s household and the price of each round trip to
the market town.
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The coefficients show that the likelihood of using the bus service declines monoton-
ically with price. Other variables that significantly predict using the bus including
being the head of the household, being married, and indicators of economic status
(asset index or producing food; not shown). Controlling for other individual and
household characteristics do not significantly affect the price coefficients. Prices were
also important in the types of trips individuals made. Figures 2 and 3 present the
reasons for making a trip (as asked on rider logs on the bus) separately by men and
by women among those who could ride the bus for free and those who had to pay
some positive price.
Among both men and women, there are differences in the types of rides made. In
particular, those who were offered a free ride were more likely to go for personal
purchases, farm or business reasons, and for health reasons. The difference in health
care visits is particularly strong among women, with those at zero price being more
than ten percentage points more likely to have used the bus for a health care visit
than those at any of the positive price levels.
The findings concur with what was found in Malawi in the late 90s where collection of
farm inputs, trips to markets and to health centres were respectively the fourth, fifth
and sixth purposes of trips (behind visiting friends, funerals and post office/public
telephone) (Rutter et al. 2000).
2.3.2 Bus providers
The interviews with transport operators reveal that most of the operators operate
on long-distance routes with a minimum distance of 48 kilometers (maximum of 140
kilometers). Buses were, on average, 14 years old, and in most cases allowed to carry
a maximum of 16 people. One of the major constraints identified by providers is the
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quality of the road. Providers tend to operate on paved roads or maintained dirt
roads. Most rural networks, such as the route leading to the project site, are not
accessible during the rainy season. When asked about travels, a typical route to and
from the market town involves a single bus making travels each leg of the trip twice
a day, with one trip on Sundays. This route is along a paved road that stretches
approximately 50 kilometers. The bus typically waits 1 to 2 hours before departure,
leaving once there is a minimum of 10 passengers. The price of a one way ride is
MK300 and passengers may board and get off at official and unofficial intermediate
stops. It should be noted that the existing bus route, being along a primary road,
does not provide direct access to remote villages. Residents of the rural villages in
our sample site need to walk to the originating depot of the bus route or walk/bike
to the paved road in order to board the bus.11
In four out of six cases the conductor is hired, and in five out of six cases paid, by
the owner of the minibus. It appears that owners are interested in hiring conductors
themselves in order to monitor the ability of drivers to generate side-profits. Increased
monitoring ability can help to collect additional fees from intermediate passengers,
thus bringing the owner’s interests in line with those of the driver, i.e. to value routes
with intermediate stops. Longer bus routes, while incurring higher costs, are more
attractive than local rides if sufficient rents can be shared by the owner and driver in
picking up intermediate passengers.
The three main factors regarding the assessment of profitability of a route are: sea-
sonality of a route (or not), high demand, and prices of existing modes of transport.
11There are also special considerations with cargo. An average of three to four people brings cargo
per full minibus. The general rule is that small cargo - items that can be stored on a passenger’s lap -
can go for free. The content of the cargo is rarely monitored by the driver. However, common types of
cargo include crops, especially groundnuts, and bottle crates. Larger cargo may be charged between
15 and 50 percent of a regular passenger price, but enforcement of this charge is discretionary. Only
a rough 50 percent of cargo will be charged to the passengers.
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The reason why certain owners opt for certain routes which do not stand out by
several of these criteria has to do with the location of the owner. Most owners are
uncomfortable with lack of monitoring possibilities and thus chose to have their bus
run on a route starting or ending at their place of residence. Local bus ownership can
thus be seen as foundation for servicing remote areas.
Furthermore, the quality of the road network is a decisive factor mentioned by 50 per-
cent of the sample in determining the actual route. In the case of evaluating a route on
which no bus is running, the evaluation of the road condition increases in importance.
Prices for buses depend on length, origin and destination for the trip, ranging be-
tween MK300 and MK700. If a route is neither frequented by matolas nor minibuses
originally, drivers will start with what they perceive as low prices given their own
assessment of demand and gradually raise them or have focus groups in which they
ask people about their willingness to pay. However, most drivers report that they
would shy away from such a route due to uncertainty of demand.
Seasonality is one of the most important factors which lower profit, as named by half
of respondents. In this context, seasonality should be interpreted as routes becoming
impassable during rainy season and demand fluctuations that coincide with the agri-
cultural calendar. Legal restrictions regarding maximum capacity, competition, and
illegal callers are further threats, the latter being specifically mentioned by operators
in the market town. There are also other costs for minibus providers including mem-
bership fees, repairs, and fuel.12
12Fees collected by the Minibus Association, maintenance cost, and fuel prices also have to be
taken into account when assessing profitability. While fees for being part of the Minibus Association
are mandatory and amount to MK200 up to MK750 per day, most operators do not see a benefit of
being member. The only benefit mentioned by two of the drivers is the regulation of bus departure
order; official callers prevent line-skipping - the first bus in line is first one to be allowed to start.
Owners are responsible for the majority of repairs, though drivers are usually responsible for the
74
Using accounting costs of the bus incurred during this study and the predicted de-
mand found in this analysis, we are able to estimate profits and any requisite subsidies
that would be necessary to promote bus operation between remote areas and market
towns.
In order to predict total costs, we include a fixed cost bus rental or investment term
(θ) and fuel costs that have two components, one which requires travel to pick up
passengers (fixed) and one that varies based on the level of demand.
TC = θ + γ[ω(0, d) + (ω(Q, d).ϕ(Q,B))] (2.1)
Where ω(Q, d) is a measure of fuel efficiency for the bus with demand, Q, and round-
trip travel distance d and ϕ(Q,B) is a ceiling function of number of bus trips required
to meet demand with a maximum number of passengers per trip, B. γ is the price of
fuel. Marginal cost of an additional passenger is therefore:
MC = γ(ω′(Q, d).ϕ′(Q,B))] (2.2)
Based on the cost of bus operation incurred by this study we set the cost parameters13
θ = 7000
d = 34 kilometers
γ = MK213
ω(Q, d) = [0.29 + 0.0015Q]d
ϕ(Q,B) = min{n ∈ Z | n ≥ Q
B
}
replacement of tires. Tire replacement usually occurs twice annually. This is of importance to
servicing remote areas, since the probability of tire damage increases along dirt and ungraded roads.
The driver will be less inclined to seek out rural routes as a result. Fuel prices reflect both distance
and location of purchase. Again, bus service in more remote areas leads to increased costs of bus
operation due to a lack of infrastructure, in this case, filling stations.
13All parameters are in the appendix.
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B = 14
Due to the non-linearity of the bus trip function, ϕ(Q,B), marginal costs spike at
the points where an additional bus trip is required. The marginal cost of adding an
additional bus trip is substantial. The fixed costs of the bus imply that carrying the
first passenger costs MK11,200 (US$75). Each additional trip beyond the first trip
implies a MK2100 cost increase. The marginal cost of adding an additional passenger
to an existing bus trip, i.e. increasing passengers from 2 to 3, is a minimal MK10.86.
Therefore, our model suggests that fixed costs matter a great deal in achieving low
marginal costs.
Total revenues are estimated based on the inverse demand curve for bus use (equa-
tion 2). For demonstration, we assume a linear demand curve; however, we utilize
regression estimates for the demand curve in our profit calculations.
p =
α
β
− 1
β
Q (2.3)
Total revenue is thus
TR = (
α
β
− 1
β
Q)Q (2.4)
and marginal revenue
MR =
α
β
− 2
β
Q (2.5)
Based on estimated total cost and total revenues, we see no point at which the bus
would generate positive profit. Table 3 shows the revenue estimates based on demand
estimates assuming a non-linear demand curve. We base the demand estimates of an
unconditioned regression of Phase 2 bus rides on dummies for price levels. The base
demand at MK0 would be 28 passengers per day, falling to 0.21 passengers per day
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at MK500 price. Based on the costs of this project and the estimated demand, we
see that profit is maximized between prices MK100 and MK300, but is nevertheless
negative.
Our findings suggest that subsidizing a daily bus to the market cluster included in this
study would be costly. We see that a daily subsidy of MK10,082 (US$67) would be at
least needed to achieve a breakeven point for the bus operator (for a roundtrip). This
finding is crucial since there is a usual plea to call for competition in transport ser-
vices in rural areas in order to curb transport prices. This experiment demonstrates
that competition, in this case, is impossible to get and, even worse, one operator can
never break-even.
The requisite subsidy is due to both supply and demand factors. On the cost side,
high fixed costs of bus rental and discontinuities in costs caused by the discrete jump
in costs once a bus becomes full drive up the cost of bus operation. On the revenue
side, we find that population density and significant price sensitivity drive down ag-
gregate demand for the bus service to the point where the bus route would not be
profitable for a private firm.14
2.4 Policy implications
The results from the experiment in Malawi present several policy implications as well
as future directions for research. Notably, infrastructure upgrade and rehabilitation
should not be the only answer to connectivity problems in rural areas; transport ser-
vices provision should also be looked at in details.
14This is similar to the findings of Rutter et al. (2000) and Hine and Rutter (2000) with, for
instance, an inverse relationship between loading times and population density: in low population
density districts, loading times are longer, which is detrimental to the quality of services.
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There are two possible major objectives with subsequent different public interven-
tions15
1. Ensure motorized service provision (bus/truck),
2. Ensure non-motorized service provision.
In the first case, the results of the experiment clearly demonstrate that a mix of public
interventions between road investments and service subsidies needs to be found. As-
suming USD$ 3,000 per kilometer to maintain an earth road in a passable condition
for a minibus for the year (rainy season excepted), in this case, USD$ 60,000 have to
be spent16(which is equivalent to over USD$ 100 per household). Service provision
subsidies in this case would be approximately equivalent to USD$ 12,000.17 Assuming
that this would be possible to implement, 20% of the recurrent costs should be aimed
at subsidizing a bus operator to make it break-even.18 Not subsidizing services would
be equivalent to a waste in road investment since villagers will either walk on this
road or use intermediate means of transport (IMTs), such as bicycles or motorcycles
and, therefore, a high level of service19 for the road would not be needed.
In the second case, road level of service (technical standard, width...) should be
reduced20 aiming at ensuring passability of intermediate means of transport, which
would mean the importance of working exclusively on critical points/obstacles (small
15Due to the existence of poverty traps (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005) and the need to increase
rural growth, subsidizing transport services could be justified in order to increase the economic
impact of rural roads.
16Hine and Rutter (2000) gave the figure of over 50 USD per head.
17Assuming that a bus service during a period of six months.
18It would be obviously crucially important to determine how service provision would be subsidized
and update regularly the amounts in order to limit waste.
19Level of service generally describe traffic conditions in terms of speed and travel time, volume
and capacity, traffic interruptions, comfort and safety.
20Where repressed demand is not high.
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bridges for instance).
Like pointed out in Raballand et al. (2010) using Cameroon, Burkina Faso and
Uganda examples, there is a continuum of integration to markets for most households
in Africa. In some cases, a road may be non-passable for cars, a motorcycle driver
may, for instance, dismount the motorcycle and walk it around the trouble spot in
the road and then continues his trip. Therefore, from an economic perspective, most
rural populations are somehow connected to markets whereas most data analysis or
policy prescriptions are based off of binary classifications of connectivity as either 0 or
1. Hence, from a public policy perspective, investments in roads might have a lower
impact on economic development than expected due to the fact that transport con-
nectivity is only one component of rural development, and sometimes not the most
important.21 It may also explain why despite major investments in rural roads in
some countries, poverty reduction has not reduced significantly.
In any case, economic and social data (such as traffic data, vehicle operating costs for
minibuses/IMTs, purpose of minibus usage) need to be collected for policy-makers
to decide on which investment choice is required to enable which type of service
provision, based primarily on demand assessment. Surveying transport demand in
the Western part of the country, Zambia JCTR (2008) found that 92% of the local
farmers surveyed do not produce more than 50 bags of 50 kilos each of agricultural
products in a year, which means that without consolidation, the current demand does
not justify transport services to develop.
There is a recurrent lack of data collection on the demand side and many investments
21Ruijs et al. (2004) find out that the direct effect of transport costs reductions on food prices,
such as cereals, requires some nuance and tempered expectations in the case of Burkina Faso, notably
due to the organization of markets.
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are carried out on the multiple assumptions that roads improvement translates into
reduced vehicle operating costs (VOCs), which are then assumed to be passed to the
final users of transport services.
In reality, reduced VOCs do not translate to reduced transport prices (especially
where volumes are low) and reduced transport prices do not translate to poverty re-
duction if the poor can not afford to use transport services or need other factors to
increase production.
From a donor perspective, this experiment demonstrates that a rule of thumb such as
the RAI is likely to be an investment waste in many rural areas in SSA since, at best,
a motorized service will be provided at an unaffordable price for most households and
at worse, no motorized transport will be provided, which means that most households
will continue not to go to a trade center/small town or to go by cycling and even more
probably by walking.
2.5 Conclusion and areas for further research
The randomized experiment summarized in this paper is the first of this kind in SSA
and illustrates that road condition does not necessarily generate transport provision
at an affordable price for villagers and does not necessarily enable minibus providers
to break-even. It confirms that affordability in rural areas in SSA can be very low
and makes service provision profitability unpredictable in most cases.
Therefore, in this context, setting rigid rules on investments across the continent is
likely to increasingly add wastes since investments are likely to go further and further
in remote places where demand may not necessarily justify services provision to break
even. On the contrary, there is an increasing need to differentiate allocations/technical
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solutions and possibly service subsidies to adjust investments to potential demand.
Areas for future research are numerous since this is only a start to use such approach
in transport. Moreover, there may be some specificities related to Malawi: Hine and
Rutter (2000) had found out that the use of motorized transport services in Malawi
was extremely low compared to Ghana, for instance. Moreover, there may be some
area-specific features
Therefore, it would be important to undertake such experiments in areas with higher
population density than this study site to assess the affordability level and potential
demand and for a longer period of time since some decisions to invest in agriculture
could be taken on the fact that a bus provision is guaranteed for at least two sea-
sons. Moreover, in an area like Nchtisi, where potential demand/affordability seem
to be low, it would be important to have randomized experiment with IMTs: would
a subsidy of bicycles, tractor, oxcart would generate more demand or not? What
would be the break-even point and would villagers could then afford a trip to town
at the break-even point? Moreover, it could be important to design some incentives
for farmers to consolidate transport and assess the impact on transport supply and
prices (like presented in Kunaka 2011).
This type of work is crucial in order to design solutions, which would then increase on
the ground access to markets/services because, for the time being, despite discourse
and massive investments in infrastructure, it may actually not have the expected
outcome on access and then crowd out investments in other sectors, where it could
have a greater impact on economic and social development.
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2.6 Figures
Figure 2.1: Bus Service Take-up according to Prices. Results are based on the indi-
viduals that participated in Phase 2.
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Figure 2.2: Trip Purposes for Women
Figure 2.3: Trip Purposes for Men
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2.7 Tables
Adult Used Bus Total Inbound Rides
1 2 3 4
MK10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.28 -0.26
(0.06) (0.05) (0.24) (0.22)
MK20 -0.09 -0.08 -0.34 -0.33
(0.06) (0.06) (0.25) (0.23)
MK50 -0.18*** -0.15** -0.63** -0.56**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.25) (0.23)
MK100 -0.14** -0.15** -0.74*** -0.77***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.21) (0.20)
MK300 -0.41*** -0.43*** -1.20*** -1.26***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.19) (0.20)
MK500 -0.47*** -0.49*** -1.32*** -1.35***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.18) (0.18)
Male 0.02 0.41***
(0.04) (0.14)
Head of Household 0.14*** 0.46***
(0.04) (0.17)
Married 0.09** 0.22*
(0.04) (0.13)
Adults in the Household -0.01 -0.08
(0.02) (0.06)
Children in the Household -0.00 0.04
(0.01) (0.04)
Constant 0.47*** 0.41*** 1.32*** 1.55***
(0.04) (0.11) (0.18) (0.40)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.339 0.340 0.844 0.847
N 936 933 936 933
R2 0.094 0.155 0.053 0.124
Table 2.1: Bus Use in Response to Prices. Results are based on the individuals that
participated in Phase 2. Note: This table presents OLS regressions on bus
use for adults (18 years or older). Heteroskedasticity-robust household-
clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <
0.1
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MK0 MK10 MK20 MK50 MK100 MK300 MK500
Price 0 10 20 50 100 300 500
Demand vs. MK0 (*) 0.00 -0.28 -0.42 -0.61 -0.75 -1.26 -1.34
Bus rides to market
town in one month 1.35 1.07 0.93 0.74 0.60 0.09 0.01
Bus rides to market
town per day 0.023 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.002 0.000
Adult Population 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
Total adult market
town bus rides per day 27.93 22.18 19.29 15.22 12.38 1.96 0.21
Total Revenue 0.00 221.76 385.79 761.22 1237.68 587.14 103.45
Marginal Per
Passenger Revenue 0 10 8.50 24.66 38.50 -332.40 -2337.85
Average Per
Passenger Revenue 0 10 20 50 100 300 500
Projected Profit
(Daily) -13583 -13296 -13099 -12681 -10082 -10624 -11097
Table 2.2: Revenues Estimates. Note: Values in Malawi Kwacha. Demand estimates
are based on coefficients from unconditional regression of the total phase
2 bus rides on a set of dummies for each price level. (*) Calibration over
the full sample
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CHAPTER III
In the Public Eye: Distributional Choices in Rural
Malawi Under Perfect and Imperfect Information
3.1 Introduction
People care deeply about their social image, more so in small, tightly knit commu-
nities as opposed to more fragmented, anonymous settings. In Sub-Saharan Africa,
including Malawi, people predominantly live in such small communities, making social
image concerns likely to influence various aspects of their decision making, includ-
ing economic actions. However, living conditions are in the process of changing in
even the remotest of locations as broader socio-economic transformations take place
in these countries. Modernization is forcing these traditional communities to slowly
disintegrate, weakening the potential influence of social image on economic behavior.
The influence of culture on economic growth is a recurrent theme in the development
literature, ever since the seminal work of Weber (1992). In this context, sharing
norms have often been the focus of interest due to their influence on redistribution,
and hence, incentives for productive activity within a community or society.
Given the changes in community structures in rural areas of developing countries,
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it is therefore of great interest for this debate to investigate if, and to what extent,
these sharing norms are dependent on social image or are fully internalized by people.
If the former is the case, we might expect more abrupt changes in social behavior when
communities become less tightly knit, i.e. we might see larger, faster, and clearly dis-
cernable changes in behavior due to erosion of traditional structures. In other words,
as soon as the relevance of the concern about social image is altered by a change of
environment, individuals would optimize differently. Fully internalized norms which
are not followed due to any social image effect, on the other hand, are likely to be
eroded gradually and adaptively, based on the requirements of a changed social and
economic environment. Depending on two factors - whether the norms a commu-
nity follows provide incentives for productive activities, and the direction in which
‘social image effects’ alter the behavior of individuals - these different scenarios will
lead to different predictions regarding the potential interaction between moderniza-
tion, changes in sharing norms, and further feedback effects on economic development.
Specifically, what this paper does is to observe whether and how sharing behavior
regarding effort-generated social surplus of individuals in rural Malawi changes, when
they know that their contribution to and share taken of the social surplus cannot be
fully observed by other individuals, i.e. how social image concerns determine optimal
shares in this setting.
This study builds on a branch of literature, started by Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993),
which primarily uses ultimatum games to investigate the effects of incomplete infor-
mation of the responder about the size of the pie on sharing behavior of the proposer.1
1See Gueth et al. (1996), and Huck (1999) for other studies belonging to this branch of literature.
For examples of other related literature see, f.ex. Roth and Malouf (1979) and Roth et al. (1981),
who investigate bargaining behavior between two individuals when the size of the prize is not known
to one of the players.
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The effect generally found is that proposers pretend to be more generous but are de
facto more selfish than under full information. This is achieved by creating the im-
pression that they follow a sharing rule that would be perceived as fair by a majority
of players for a small pie when in reality the pie to be shared is large, this being not
known to the responder with certainty.
Specifically, Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) introduce the notion of “anticipation phi-
losophy” where proposers take the expected level of acceptance of an offer by the
responder into account when making their sharing decision. This acceptance level de-
pends on the expected size of the common pot in case of an offer game (i.e. whether
at least half of the expected pie is given to the responder) and whether a demand
is clearly unfair (less than half of the small pie is left to the responder) in case of a
demand game.
Contrary to most of this literature, I employ dictator games to distinguish whether it
is the fear that the responder will reject an offer perceived to be unfair, or truly con-
cern about ones social image, that drives expected changes to sharing behavior under
incomplete information. In a dictator game only the latter consideration should play
a role.
The only other study, to my knowledge, which employs dictator games in this context
is Ockenfels and Werner (2011) who conducted their study online using newspaper
readers in Germany as experimental subjects. The study featured a complete infor-
mation and an incomplete information treatment with two different pie sizes in each
treatment. In both cases subjects make their decisions about windfall income, i.e.
the pie was not generated by the subjects themselves. The main finding of this study
is that dictators in the incomplete information treatment are more frequently giving
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less or equal to half of the small pie to the receivers than dictators in the complete
information treatment, i.e. subjects pretended in a sophisticated way that they were
facing a small pie and behaving in a fair manner given that.
In contrast to Ockenfels and Werner (2011), I investigate social image effects for
effort-generated (as opposed to windfall) income in a developing (as opposed to highly
industrialized) country setting. This aspect of the study throws light on the ongoing
debate about culture as a factor in economic development as detailed above. Ad-
ditionally, a novel aspect of my study is the attempt to distinguish the influence of
different norms of distributive justice on sharing decisions similar to Cappelen et al.
(2007) and capture trade-offs between selfishness, fairness considerations, and social
image effects.
Ockenfels and Werner (2011) note that due to the setting of their experiment, an un-
natural distance between the experimental subjects (newspaper readers) exists which
may limit transferability of results. The present study, on the other hand, was con-
ducted in rural communities of a developing country where subjects interact in their
natural surroundings. This arguably renders the results less domain specific.
In addition, I make use of a rich set of demographic and socio-economic data to in-
vestigate the determinants and predictors of selfish behavior, norm-based behavior,
and decision making guided by social image concerns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of decision
making. Section 3 details the experimental set-up while section 4 talks about the
implementation in the field. Section 5 discusses empirical results, while section 6
concludes and provides an outlook on emerging questions.
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3.2 Model
The subsequent discussion closely follows Cappelen et al. (2007) and Mueller (2011b).
I study two-person dictator games with a production phase. Players are denoted by
i, with i = 1 for the dictator and i = 2 for the receiver. The players may differ
with respect to effort chosen, ei, and rate of return, ai. Vectors e and a are de-
fined as e = (e1, e2) and a = (a1, a2). The production functions x1 = e1a1 and
x2 = e2a2 determine the dictator’s and the receiver’s respective effort-generated in-
come. X(e, a) = x1(e1, a1) + x2(e2, a2) denotes the total effort-generated income that
is to be distributed among team members by the dictator.2 Each dictator allocates an
amount y ≤ X to herself, leaving X−y for the receiver. Non-effort-generated income
is denoted as z1 and z2, with z = (z1, z2), and comprises monetary endowments of
the players as well as money received for foregoing options to exert effort as will be
explained in section 3.
Individuals are assumed to have other-regarding preferences, i.e. they care about
their own income and about the fairness of a distributional situation. In addition,
subjects’ beliefs about how self-interested they are perceived to be by others, are
assumed to directly enter their utility function by affecting their marginal utility of
income. Specifically, dictators are assumed to maximize the utility function
V (y; e, a, z, b, s) = (γ0 + γ1I(h))y −
∑
k
βk
(y −mk(e, a, z, b, s))2
2X(e, a)
.
mk(e, a, z) is the fair amount of effort-generated income that the dictator should keep
for herself according to norm k, while γ0 > 0, γ1 > 0, δ ≥ 0, and βk ≥ 0 are param-
eters expressing the importance of income and fairness, respectively, to the dictator.
I(.) is an indicator function, where h denotes a state of the world in which half of the
2Total effort-generated income is also referred to as “social surplus” or “money in the common
pot” throughout this paper.
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dictator’s contribution to the common pot remains “hidden” from the receiver. The
assumption is that dictators who believe that the receiver might perceive them as less
self-interested than they really are, place a higher weight on income as opposed to
fairness considerations.
Maximizing this function determines the optimal share y∗ to be
y∗ =
∑
k βkm
k(e, a, z, b, s)∑
k βk
+
(γ0 + γ1I(h))X(e, a)∑
k βk
,
under the assumption that an interior solution exists.
Optimal shares for each dictator are assumed to be co-determined by at least one
of the following norms: strict egalitarianism (SE), inequality aversion (IA), liberal
egalitarianism (LE), or libertarianism (L), all of which satisfy the no-waste condition.
According to strict egalitarianism dictators and receivers should receive equal shares
of the social surplus, hence
mSE(e, a, z) =
X(e, a)
2
. (3.1)
According to inequality aversion in its simplest form, total incomes of players are to
be equalized in an optimal allocation, hence
mIA(e, a, z) = (z2 − z1) + X(e, a)− (z2 − z1)
2
(3.2)
if z1 ≤ z2, and
mIA(e, a, z) =
X(e, a)− (z1 − z2)
2
(3.3)
if z1 > z2.
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According to the principle of liberal egalitarianism, optimal shares should be propor-
tional to the relative effort choices of players. Hence,
mLE(e, a, z) =
e1
e1 + e2
X(e, a). (3.4)
Libertarianism, on the other hand, is an outcome based principle: The fair share for
the dictator is given by the dictator’s marginal product to the social surplus,
mL(e, a, z) =
a1e1
a1e1 + a2e2
X(e, a) (3.5)
= a1e1.
3.3 Experimental Design
The analysis in this paper is based on two treatments of a one-shot, two-person dic-
tator game with a production stage.3 320 randomly selected participants from rural
parts of Ntchisi District in the Central Region of Malawi were assigned to the different
treatments during recruitment. Please refer to Figure 1 for details of randomization
and sample sizes. Their eligibility to take part in a scientific experiment about com-
munity norms, including survey parts, was communicated to the participants during
both recruitment and consenting phase. Individuals were told the following details:
First, that the experiment would involve decision making and potentially carrying out
a simple task, similar to one they might do at home or work; and second, that the
experiment might involve the distribution of money between themselves and another
participant of the experiment.
Subjects learned that the minimum they would earn was a token gift worth ap-
3The entire experiment consisted of eight treatments. The other treatments are discussed in
Mueller (2011b).
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proximately 30 Malawi Kwacha (MK), and, depending on their and their partner’s
decisions, an additional monetary amount between 0 MK up to 350 MK. 350 MK
corresponded to 2.18 US-Dollar (typical cash bid rate) during the time of this study.
This was put into perspective for subjects by informing them that the total partici-
pation time (including travel, consenting, experiment, surveys, and payment) would
not exceed three hours. De facto participation time was approximately 1.5 hours, see
section 4.4 The value of the incentives to participants can be understood in the con-
text of the following facts: (1) 46.7 percent of the population in the Central Region
lived at or below the national poverty line of 16,165 MK per year (i.e. approximately
44.29 MK per day) as recently as 2005, with 16.1 percent classified as “ultra-poor”
according to the World Bank (2007), where ultra-poor indicates the inability of in-
dividuals to meet their recommended daily food needs. (2) I collected the data used
in this paper during the months of July and August 2010. Both months fall in the
dry season which is characterized by especially low, constant opportunity costs for
participants. Goldberg (2010), for example, who conducted a labor supply study in
Malawi’s Central Region during the dry season, offered various wages for sessions of
hard physical labor, and found that over 70 percent of her sample of 529 subjects
chose to work at a rate of only 30 MK per day. Thus, monetary rewards provided by
my experiment were clearly substantial.
The rest of this section proceeds as follows. I first detail the general experimental
procedure and elaborate how the treatments allow for the identification of the norms
presented in the model section. I then highlight how the differences between the
benchmark and the incomplete information treatment are able to generate data aimed
at answering the main question of this paper, i.e. whether and how subjects’ beliefs
about their own social image in this particular context directly enter their utility
4Three hours was mentioned as an upper limit based on an outlier during piloting.
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function.
3.3.1 General Experimental Procedure
Lists of the information subjects had at various stages of the game are provided in
Tables 1− 4. At the initial stage of instructions, subjects learned that they had been
anonymously matched with another player from the same location before receiving
their endowments. The monetary part of the endowments was given to them in the
form of bottle caps, with one bottle cap representing 10 MK.5 Players were aware of
the rate of conversion. Unsorted bags of beans formed the non-monetary part of each
subject’s endowment. The conversion rate of 20 MK for returning an unsorted bag
of beans to the experimenter was made known.
Players were then informed of their options. They could sort zero, one or both of
their bags before returning them to the experimenter. Rates of return for sorting
bags were either high (80 MK per sorted bag) or low (40 MK per sorted bag), and
assigned and announced to the subjects ex ante. However, players did not learn their
partner’s rate of return. Special emphasis was placed on conveying to the subjects
that the higher return from sorting would become part of a common pot belonging
to them and their partner while the lower return from returning unsorted bags would
go straight to them. Individuals learned that this social surplus would be divided
by either them or the other player and that the dictator’s identity would be revealed
5This level of divisibility of currency was chosen throughout the experiment based on informal
focus group discussions conducted by study staff. Here, the largest unit of money which was not
uniformly seen as “making a difference” was 5 MK. Note that the focus groups were conducted in
the second biggest trading center of the district, i.e. an area in which individuals face higher average
prices than our typical study participant. To be on the safe side I chose 10 MK to be the smallest
unit for my experiment. Goods can be bought for as little as 0.5 MK in the study region. Examples
of goods priced at only 10 MK in rural areas of the study district (in 2010, at the time the study
took place) are a large piece of bread or a package of pain killers. Given the great overall poverty
of experimental subjects and the outcomes of the focus group discussions, we can be confident that
the differences between each pair of potential dictator shares was substantial enough to incentivize
strategic behavior.
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only after all sorting decisions had been carried out.
Subjects were told that divisions would be made according to the strategy method,
i.e. dictators would be asked to share hypothetical common pots for all potential
effort-choice/rate of return combinations of the receiver given their own effort choice
and rate of return. During instruction, it was further conveyed that payment would
immediately follow participation and that all players would learn about their partner’s
sorting decision at that point. The rate of return of the matched player, on the other
hand, would only become known to a player if she was a) a dictator or b) a receiver
in the benchmark treatment, i.e. receivers in the incomplete information treatment
knew they would never learn the true rate of return of the dictator just as the dic-
tators in that treatment knew that receivers would never learn their rate of return.
Receivers in the benchmark treatment would learn about the payoff relevant sharing
decision of the dictator in addition.6 Hence, before subjects made decisions, they had
complete information about the production, distribution, and payment phase of the
game. Common knowledge between matched players was established by the end of
the instruction phase.
Sorting decisions had to be made after a brief test-sorting, immediately following
instruction, in which subjects could familiarize themselves with the specifics of the
effort task. The status of the players (dictator versus receiver) was revealed following
the implementation of the sorting decision. After this, dictators entered the distri-
bution phase. A dictator could change her mind about each of her sharing decisions
once. During subsequent payment, final payoffs for each individual - which comprised
6This implies that these receivers did not have the right to learn about the dictator’s entire
strategy and that subjects were aware of this fact. Note also, that the sharing decision could
have been backed out by the player in the benchmark treatment. However, given the educational
limitations of the experimental subjects in this study we chose to perform this calculation for them
so that there would not be any kind of bias based on the arithmetic ability among the participants.
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their monetary endowment, the payment for bags they had returned unsorted, and
the share of the common pot the individual was to receive based on the dictator’s
wishes - were determined by the experimenter. Dictators learned the sorting decisions
and rates of return of matched receivers independent of their treatment groups at this
point. Receivers in the benchmark treatment learned the same information about the
dictators. In addition, they were told her payoff relevant sharing decision. Receivers
in the incomplete information treatment, on the other hand, only learned the sorting
decision of the dictator.
3.3.2 Experimental Set-up and Norms
Both treatments in this study are designed to learn about the distribution over strict
egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism, as in Cappelen et al. (2007).
Additionally, some individuals might base their decisions on inequality aversion since
endowments and money from returning unsorted bags for both players, as well as the
money in the common pot, are displayed prior to each allocation decision subjects
are required to make. Purely selfish allocations are those in which the dictator takes
the entire common pot for the purpose of this discussion.
Subjects acting in line with libertarianism have the lowest informational requirements
since the optimal libertarian share is always one’s own marginal contribution. Infor-
mation about the common pot is sufficient for both purely selfish and strict egalitarian
allocations: dictators keep 100 percent and 50 percent, respectively. Liberal egali-
tarians reward themselves and others proportional to relative effort. Since additional
effort from both players also increases common pot size, optimal amounts for liberal
egalitarianism are depicted for different effort levels of the dictator conditional on
the receiver’s effort level and both players’ rate of return. Inequality aversion is de-
picted in the same way. However, the mechanism through which higher effort levels
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increase a player’s optimal share is more indirect compared to liberal egalitarianism:
exerting additional effort implies that fewer bags are returned to the experimenter
unsorted. Hence, a player who exerted more effort must be “compensated” for giv-
ing up this type of income in addition to creating a larger social surplus, to be shared.
Four different scenarios give us the possibility to distinguish norms:
1) Matched players are assigned the same rate of return and choose to sort
an identical number of bags. All norms prescribe equal shares for the players.
2) Matched players are assigned identical rates of return, but choose to
sort a different number of bags. Strict egalitarianism prescribes equal shares for
the players, while all other norms prescribe an unequal distribution of the common
pot.
3) Matched players have different rates of return, but choose to sort an
identical number of bags. Libertarianism prescribes an unequal distribution of
the common pot, while all other norms prescribe equal shares.
4) Matched players are assigned different rates of return and choose to
sort a different number of bags. Here, two sub-cases can be distinguished: i) If
the contributions of the players to the common pot do not coincide, optimal shares
are unequal under all norms except for strict egalitarianism. ii) If the contributions
to the common pot coincide, libertarianism and strict egalitarianism prescribe equal
shares. Liberal egalitarianism and inequality aversion prescribe unequal shares.
3.3.3 Benchmark and Incomplete Information Treatment and Dictator
Beliefs
I employ two treatments to investigate whether and to what degree incomplete in-
formation of the other player about own rate of return plays a role for distributional
decisions of the dictators. In the benchmark treatment, both, effort levels and rates of
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return of the other player become known to each subject during the payment phase.
In contrast to this, the rate of return of the dictator will never become known to the
receiver in the incomplete information treatment. The dictator is aware of this fact
while making her decisions. If dictators care about social image we may expect them
to derive a higher marginal utility from own income relative to fairness considerations
if they are assigned a high rate of return, sorted a positive number of bags, and were
part of the incomplete information treatment as compared to all other situations, i.e.
if half of their contribution to the social surplus cannot be seen by the receiver (please
refer to section 2 above).
3.4 Field Experimental Procedures
This section describes the details of the field experiment, including data collection
and game procedures, following Mueller (2011b) closely in its structure and presen-
tation.
The study was implemented in the field through three distinct parts: a baseline sur-
vey, the game, and an opinion survey. The site of the project was Ntchisi District, a
poor, rural district in Malawi’s Central Region. The experiment was conducted over
a period of 20 days, 4 rounds (each in a different location) per day. The requirement
for each round was a minimum of 40 households in one location with random selection
of 16 participant households out of those. 4 participants out of 4 households were
part of this study, while the remaining 12 participants were part of treatments which
form the basis for analysis in Mueller (2011b). Careful precautions were taken to
avoid contamination of the experiment due to subjects learning about the game from
interaction with prior participants.7
7For details please refer to section 4 in Mueller (2011b).
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Recruitment in each location took place as follows: Upon arrival, assistance was
sought from the group village headmen8 or chiefs in drawing up a map of the houses
in that particular location. The study team numbered the houses based on the order
in which they were drawn. Eligibility of households was determined by drawing 16
numbers out of an envelope with as many numbered paper slips as there were houses.9
Recruitment scripts were used to approach eligible households. A household listing
including all adult members of the household who had been present in the household
the previous night was compiled.10 Numbers were assigned based on the order in
which household members were mentioned. Drawing a numbered piece of paper out
of an envelope that contained as many numbered paper slips as candidates for partici-
pation in that particular household, determined the person eligible for participation.11
Consenting of participants and a short baseline survey were conducted at a local
chief’s residence. Each subject was matched with another subject in the same lo-
cation. Hence, participants were aware of average player characteristics for their
location, even though the precise matching with a partner was anonymous both dur-
ing and after the experiment.12 Treatment-specific game instructions were delivered
one on one in a place which guaranteed privacy.13
All treatments were played in each location. Rotation of enumerators guaranteed that
8A group village headman is the direct superior of several chiefs whose villages form a cluster.
9The remaining households served as backups. They were visited in the order they would be
drawn if it became necessary.
10Adults are individuals 18 years and above according to Malawi law.
11If no adult member of the household was available for household listing purposes, or if the
eligible household member was absent, refused or was unable to participate, a back-up household
was approached.
12This guaranteed the same degree of anonymity for different rounds, independent of participants’
houses’ locations relative to each other from one round to the next.
13Please refer to section 4 of Mueller (2011b) for a detailed discussion of the advantages of one on
one instruction in this particular context.
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each enumerator instructed four different treatments per day and collected sharing
data for each treatment the same number of times over the course of the entire study.
Instructions were delivered orally. The monetary consequences of the player sorting
0, 1, or 2 bags of beans were demonstrated to her using bottle caps and bags of beans.
Similarly, it was demonstrated to her how the monetary consequences of several sort-
ing decisions of the matched player would look like, given an assumed rate of return
for that player. Participants were prompted to ask questions at pre-defined points.
To homogenize replies across different enumerators, either parts of the script were
re-read or standardized answers were given. After instruction, subjects sorted a stan-
dardized sample amount of beans, to understand the difficulty and duration of the
task before making their irreversible sorting decisions. Enumerators and participants
learned only after sorting whether the participant was assigned the role of dictator, so
as not to influence the performance of enumerators or alter the symmetric structure of
the production stage. Receivers returned to the chief’s residence for completion of the
opinion survey. Dictators first made sharing decisions using the strategy method.14
To this end, enumerators (a) reviewed the monetary consequences of the decision
makers’ actions given her rate of return, and (b) demonstrated the consequences of
each possible effort/rate of return combination of the other player given the sorting
decision of (and associated outcome for) the dictator. For simplicity, bottle caps and
bags of beans were used to display both, (a) and (b). Immediately following the
display of each effort/rate of return combination of the other player, the dictator had
to make her respective sharing decision.15
14Please refer to section 4 Mueller (2011b) for a discussion of why only one subject in each group
was asked for her strategy as decision maker.
15The details of each sharing decision to be made were as follows: The first question aimed at the
dictator established whether she would like more, the same, or less of the common pot for herself as
compared to the player she was matched with for the specific situation that was displayed. She was
then asked for the exact amount she would like to keep. In order to overcome educational limitations
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After the elicitation of dictators’ sharing preferences, dictators had to return to the
chief’s residence as well to also complete the opinion survey. Following the matching
of answer-sheets according to a pre-specified scheme, subjects were paid in privacy by
the experimenter. At the same time they learned about the payoff relevant decisions
of their partner as far as their respective treatments allowed (please refer back to
sub-section 3.1 for details). Subjects’ participation time was approximately 1.5 hours
on average, out of which less than 45 minutes were spent on game instruction.
3.5 Results
The analysis is based on the structural model of optimal choices of dictators for
various distributional scenarios, which includes the trade-off between selfishness and
norm-abiding behavior and incorporates the hypothesis that dictators who can ‘hide’
part of their contribution to the common pot are more greedy.
The first part of the empirical analysis comprises simple tests to establish whether
the norms postulated in the model seem appropriate for analyzing the allocation
decisions in the data set. I follow with the analysis of whether dictators’ beliefs enter
their utility functions directly, i.e. whether the incomplete information treatment
leads to a change of allocation decisions as predicted. Last, I present a mixed logit
estimation to establish the relative importance of norms and own income under the
different treatments.
of the subject population the monetary consequences of her sharing decision were demonstrated with
bottle caps and the enumerators performed simple arithmetic for the participants telling the dictators
how much of the social surplus would be left for the other player, if the decision maker’s choice was
carried out, and what the final total amounts for both players would be. Subjects were allowed to
change their mind once at this stage before the enumerator moved on to displaying the monetary
consequences of another potential effort/rate of return combination of the other player. For further
details, please refer to section 4 of Mueller (2011b).
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3.5.1 Which Experimental Variations Do Subjects Respond To?
This sub-section provides a first glance at which factors other than own income dic-
tators take into account when making their sharing decisions. As in Mueller (2011b),
I restrict the data in numerous ways to isolate effects. To exclude the possibility that
subjects’ sorting decisions (see Table 5) were influenced by the treatment they were
assigned to, I first run a simple Chi2 test. The p-value is 0.24, indicating that the
data can be pooled across different sorting decisions for this first step of the analysis.
The results are summarized in Tables 6− 8. Sample sizes are stated in terms of indi-
viduals as well as in terms of observations. In addition to the mean and median share
of the common pot kept by dictators for each scenario, the number and percentage
of observations falling into each of four categories is reported: purely selfish alloca-
tions, dictator shares between 100 and 50 percent of the common pot, equal splits of
the social surplus, and “generous” allocations, for which the dictator share is lower
than 50 percent of the common pot. Based on these data, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests
and non-parametric equality of median tests allow me to assess which factors besides
utility derived directly from own income are relevant for explaining the outcome data.
Table 6 shows that with the exception of an exogenously assigned low rate of return for
the dictator, all variations which are arguments of at least one of the norms postulated
in the model section lead to significant changes of the location of the distribution of
dictator shares. Contrary to this, the differences in Table 7 are only significant if the
possibility to ‘hide’ part of the effort-generated income from the receiver is given and
the receiver has sorted a positive number of bags. To uncover these effects further, I
turn to regression analysis.
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3.5.2 Regression Analysis With Respect To Norm Predictions
In this subsection, I assess the average influence of the opportunity to hide effort-
generated income on decision making while controlling for receiver’s effort, differences
in rates of return and contribution as well as numerous baseline variables, using data
from the entire sample for a reduced form regression analysis. This step of the analysis
is meant to display what type of effect information truly has without imposing the-
oretical specifications which might obscure these patterns in the data. Since Mueller
(2011b) shows in great detail, that this particular subject population responds to all
experimental and choice variations as intuitively expected and required for the model
to be sensible, I will here focus on the information effect.
I estimate the regression equation
yis = α + γhi + Visη + is, (3.6)
where yis represents the fraction of the common pot that dictator i keeps for herself
in scenario s, where a scenario is a specific (hypothetical) effort/rate-of-return combi-
nation of the receiver. Vis is a matrix of scenario-dependent norm-relevant variables.
For different columns/specifications, it is either defined as (a) DEis, a vector of ef-
fort levels of the dictator, measured in number of bags sorted, (b) REis, a vector of
hypothetical effort levels of the receiver, measured in number of bags sorted, (c) a
vector of hypothetical differences in rates of return between dictator and receiver, (d)
a vector of hypothetical differences in dictator’s and receiver’s hypothetical (due to
the use of the strategy method) contribution to the social surplus, measured in bottle
caps, or (e) a combination of the first three vectors. hi is a variable that can take
the values 0 or 1, and denotes whether a player can ‘hide’ part of her contribution
to the common pot from her counterpart, i.e. hi takes the value 0 for dictators who
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are either in the benchmark treatment, have sorted zero bags, or have been assigned
a low rate of return.
Interestingly, information has a small but significantly positive effect on the average
share kept by dictators, i.e. with an extra 40 MK ‘hidden’, a dictator chooses to keep
another percent of the common pot on average. This effect holds for nearly all spec-
ifications, with or without the inclusion of baseline variables (see Tables 9− 12). All
other variables influence dictator shares significantly and in the direction we would
intuitively expect them to.
Overall, we can conclude, that even though effects are not large enough in magnitudes
to shift medians in a significant way, information nevertheless has significant effects
on allocation decisions for our sample. The small magnitude of the effect should not
be surprising, since strategic motives fall away in dictator games while only the social
image effect is isolated. This is in line with Ockenfels and Werner (2011) who also find
very small but intuitive and significant effects for their sample of German newspaper
readers. Since we established the existence of an information effect successfully, I will
now proceed to estimate the structural model in the following sub-section.
3.5.3 Mixed Logit
Tables 13 (mixed logit) and 1 in the appendix (conditional logit, for comparison) are
included to establish the relative importance of income and norms on decision mak-
ing, as compared to any potential effect the different information treatments might
have. Just as in Mueller (2011b), strict egalitarianism has a much larger coefficient
than the other norms. Though incomplete information has the expected effect on
dictators’ decision making, this effect proves insignificant if all other norms and the
income motive are included in the regression. We conclude that social image concerns
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are present, but not decisive for individuals’ choices.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper studies whether and how sharing behavior regarding effort-generated so-
cial surplus of individuals in rural Malawi changes, when they know that their con-
tribution to and share taken of the social surplus cannot be fully observed by other
individuals, i.e. how social image concerns determine optimal shares in this setting.
The motivational background for this paper was that people supposedly care deeply
about their social image, arguably more so in small, tightly knit communities as op-
posed to more fragmented, anonymous settings. Since the influence of culture on
economic growth is a recurrent theme in the development literature, sharing norms
have often been the focus of interest due to their influence on redistribution, and
hence, incentives for productive activity within a community or society. Given the
changes in community structures in rural areas of developing countries, it is therefore
of great interest for this debate to investigate if, and to what extent, these sharing
norms are dependent on social image or are fully internalized by people.
We do find significant but small effects of our information treatment on dictator
shares. But while we learn that subjects take social image concerns into account
when making distributional decisions, we also see that the effect is not large enough for
abrupt changes in economic behavior due to changes in the informational environment
caused by modernization. It seems that norms are to a large extent internalized, and
hence likely to be eroded gradually and adaptively, based on the requirements of a
changed social and economic environment.
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3.7 Figures
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Figure 3.1: Sample Sizes
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3.8 Tables
Benchmark Treatment
Own Rate of Return
Matched Player has 50 Percent Chance of
Having been Assigned High or Low Rate of Return
Equal Chance to be Assigned the Role of Either Dictator
or Receiver
Own Sorting Decision, Rate of Return and − in the Case
of Being Assigned Role of Dictator − Payoff Relevant
Sharing Decision Will be Revealed to the Matched Player
Table 3.1: Information Known to Players Prior to Sorting Decisions
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Incomplete Information Treatment
Own Rate of Return
Matched Player has 50 Percent Chance of
Having been Assigned High or Low Rate of Return
Equal Chance to be Assigned the Role of Either Dictator
or Receiver
Own Sorting Decision and Rate of Return Will be
Revealed to the Matched Player in the Case of Being
Assigned Role of Receiver
Own Sorting Decision and Share of the Common Pot Given to the
Receiver Will be Revealed to the Matched Player in the Case of
Being Assigned Role of Dictator
Table 3.2: Information Known to Players Prior to Sorting Decisions (continued)
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Benchmark Treatment
Dictator Receiver
Own Rate of Own Rate of
Return (A) Return (C)
Own Number of Own Number of
Bags Sorted (B) Bags Sorted (D)
Receiver’s Rate of Dictator’s Rate of
Return Return
Receiver’s Number of Dictator’s Number of
Bags Sorted Bags Sorted
Dictator’s Choices Given Dictator’s Sharing
A and B for All Decision Given
Potential Rates of A, B, C and D
Return and Number of
Bags Sorted of the Receiver
Table 3.3: Information Known to Players During Payment Phase
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Incomplete Information Treatment
Dictator Receiver
Own Rate of Own Rate of
Return (A) Return (C)
Own Number of Own Number of
Bags Sorted (B) Bags Sorted (D)
Receiver’s Rate of
Return
Receiver’s Number of Dictator’s Number
Bags Sorted of Bags Sorted
Dictator’s Choices Given Amount Given to
A and B for All Receiver by the Dictator
Potential Rates of Given B, C and D
Return and Numbers of
Bags Sorted of the Receiver
Table 3.4: Information Known to Players During Payment Phase (continued)
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Number of Bags Benchmark Treatment Incomplete Information
Sorted Treatment
Number / Percent Number / Percent
2 306/31.88 306/31.88
1 372/38.75 402/41.88
0 282/29.38 252/26.25
Table 3.5: Distribution of Number of Bags Sorted
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Data Description A B C D E F G H
1 All Observations 160 884 66.46 62.5 19.57 35.3 40.38 4.75
2 Both Dictator and Receiver
Have Identical Effort Levels
and Rate of Return 122 122 60.63 50.0* 8.20 32.78 57.38 1.64
3 Dictators Exerted More Effort
Than Matched Receivers, Both
Players Have Identical Rate
of Return 122 180 79.17 75.0(†,†) 38.33 43.34 18.33 0.0
4 Dictators Exerted Less Effort
Than Matched Receivers, Both
Players Have Identical Rate
of Return 102 140 52.32 50.0(†,†) 4.29 18.57 62.14 15.0
5 Both Dictator and Receiver
Have Identical Effort Levels
and Rate of Return 122 122 60.63 50.0* 8.20 32.78 57.38 1.64
6 Dictator Has Higher Rate of
Return, Both Players Exerted
Same Effort Level 54 54 66.04 66.67(†,†) 7.41 64.82 24.07 3.7
7 Dictator Has Lower Rate of
Return, Both Players Exerted
Same Effort Level 68 68 59.56 50.0(§,§) 5.88 35.3 50.0 8.82
8 Dictators Contribute More
to the Common Pot 122 385 78.83 75.0(†,†) 37.14 44.16 18.18 0.52
9 Dictator and Receiver
Contribute the Same to the
Common Pot 122 176 62.13 50.0* 8.52 40.91 49.43 1.14
10 Dictators Contribute Less
to the Common Pot 131 323 54.08 50.0(†,†) 4.64 21.68 61.92 11.76
Table 3.6: Dictator Shares (Strategy Method)
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Data Description A B C D E F G H
11 Benchmark Treatment 80 438 66.03 57.29* 22.15 29.0 42.69 6.16
12 Incomplete Information
Treatment 80 446 66.89 62.5(§,§) 17.04 41.48 38.12 3.36
13 Benchmark Treatment
Excluding 0 Hypo. Sort. 80 320 58.84 50.0* 7.81 31.87 51.88 8.44
14 Incomplete Information
Treatment Excluding
0 Hypo. Sort. 80 320 61.00 50.0(‡,‡) 5.63 43.74 45.94 4.69
15 Benchmark Treatment,
Dictator Has Higher
Rate of Return 36 198 67.57 62.5* 23.74 31.81 36.87 7.58
16 Incomplete Information
Treatment, Dictator Has
Higher Rate of Return 35 194 67.58 66.67(§,§) 12.37 55.77 27.74 4.12
17 Benchmark Treatment,
Dictator Has Higher
Rate of Return,
Excluding 0 Hypo. Sort. 36 144 59.70 50.0* 6.94 36.11 46.53 10.42
18 Incomplete Information
Treatment, Dictator Has
Higher Rate of Return,
Excluding 0 Hypo. Sort. 35 140 63.20 62.5(‡,†) 5.71 59.29 29.29 5.71
19 Benchmark Treatment,
Dictator Has Lower
Rate of Return 44 240 64.77 50.0* 20.83 26.67 47.5 5.00
20 Incomplete Information
Treatment, Dictator Has
Lower Rate of Return 45 252 66.35 50.0(§,§) 20.63 28.18 48.41 2.78
21 Benchmark Treatment,
Dictator Has Lower
Rate of Return,
Excluding 0 Hypo. Sort. 44 176 58.14 50.0* 8.52 28.41 56.25 6.82
22 Incomplete Information
Treatment, Dictator Has
Lower Rate of Return
Excluding 0 Hypo. Sort. 45 180 59.21 50.0(§,§) 5.56 31.66 58.89 3.89
Table 3.7: Dictator Shares (Strategy Method). Continued from previous page
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A Number of Individuals
B Number of Observations
C Mean Share of Commonpot Kept by Dictators
D Median Share of Commonpot Kept by Dictators
E Share of Commonpot Kept by Dictator is 100 (in Percent)
F Share of Commonpot Kept by Dictator is Between 50 and 100 (in Percent)
G Share of Commonpot Kept by Dictator is 50 (in Percent)
H Share of Commonpot Kept by Dictator is Less Than 50 (in Percent)
* Benchmark Group
§ Not Significantly Different from Benchmark Group
‡ Significantly Different from Benchmark Group at 5 Percent
† Significantly Different from Benchmark Group at 1 Percent
First Superscript Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test Results
Second Superscript Nonparametric Equality-of-Median Test Results
Table 3.8: Dictator Shares (Strategy Method) (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hidden 0.046** 0.015 0.037** 0.066*** -0.056*** 0.006
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.018) (0.021)
Dictator’s Effort 0.121*** 0.103***
(0.013) (0.012)
Receiver’s Effort -0.110*** -0.097***
(0.010) (0.010)
Difference in Rates -0.011 0.003
of Return (0.008) (0.007)
Differences in
Contributions (Measured 0.015***
in Bottle Caps) (0.001)
Constant 0.651*** 0.519*** 0.774*** 0.642*** 0.685*** 0.648***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021)
No. of Obs. 446 446 446 446 446 446
R2 0.01 0.18 0.21 0.02 0.28 0.33
Demographic and Socio-
Economic Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO
Table 3.9: Regression of Dictator Shares. * Significant at 10 Percent; ** Significant
at 5 Percent; *** Significant at 1 Percent
115
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hidden 0.055*** 0.012 0.046*** 0.067*** -0.047** 0.008
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.022)
Dictator’s Effort 0.120*** 0.100***
(0.015) (0.014)
Receiver’s Effort -0.109*** -0.098***
(0.010) (0.010)
Difference in Rates -0.007 0.002
of Return (0.009) (0.007)
Differences in
Contributions (Measured 0.014***
in Bottle Caps) (0.001)
Constant 0.466*** 0.495*** 0.605*** 0.462*** 0.620*** 0.616***
(0.061) (0.057) (0.056) (0.062) (0.054) (0.053)
No. of Obs. 408 408 408 408 408 408
R2 0.07 0.2 0.27 0.07 0.32 0.36
Demographic and Socio-
Economic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 3.10: Regression of Dictator Shares. * Significant at 10 Percent; ** Significant
at 5 Percent; *** Significant at 1 Percent
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hidden 0.070*** 0.042** 0.070*** 0.081*** 0.014 0.034
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022)
Dictator’s Effort 0.086*** 0.087***
(0.012) (0.012)
Receiver’s Effort -0.039** -0.039**
(0.018) (0.016)
Difference in Rates -0.006 0.004
of Return (0.008) (0.007)
Differences in
Contributions (Measured 0.009***
in Bottle Caps) (0.001)
Constant 0.584*** 0.500*** 0.643*** 0.580*** 0.628*** 0.561***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.029) (0.013) (0.013) (0.029)
No. of Obs. 320 320 320 320 320 320
R2 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.19
Demographic and Socio-
Economic Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO
Table 3.11: Regression of Dictator Shares (Excluding 0 Hypo. Sort.). * Significant
at 10 Percent; ** Significant at 5 Percent; *** Significant at 1 Percent
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hidden 0.074*** 0.044** 0.074*** 0.080*** 0.027 0.040*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
Dictator’s Effort 0.077*** 0.077***
(0.013) (0.013)
Receiver’s Effort -0.032* -0.032**
(0.017) (0.016)
Difference in Rates -0.004 0.002
of Return (0.008) (0.008)
Differences in
Contributions (Measured 0.007***
in Bottle Caps) (0.002)
Constant 0.482*** 0.505*** 0.530*** 0.480*** 0.568*** 0.555***
(0.055) (0.052) (0.060) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
No. of Obs. 292 292 292 292 292 292
R2 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.23
Demographic and Socio-
Economic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 3.12: Regression of Dictator Shares (Excluding 0 Hypo. Sort.). * Significant
at 10 Percent; ** Significant at 5 Percent; *** Significant at 1 Percent
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SE LE L IA SE, LE, L, IA
Mean
y 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.04***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Case Hidden 0.06*** 0.00 -0.01* -0.00 0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
SE Loss Term 1.01*** 1.24***
(0.15) (0.21)
LE Loss Term 0.23*** -0.01
(0.03) (0.06)
L Loss Term 0.15*** 0.11**
(0.02) (0.05)
IA Loss Term 0.04*** 0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
SD
SE Loss Term 0.88*** 1.03***
(0.15) (0.17)
LE Loss Term 0.13*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
L Loss Term 0.07*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.04)
IA Loss Term 0.00 0.06**
(0.00) (0.03)
Log Likelihood -684.05 -815.15 -839.25 -888.08 -661.87
Number of
Observations 6264 6264 6264 6264 6264
LRChi2 238.10*** 44.08*** 20.46*** 0.00 252.92***
Table 3.13: Mixed Logit Estimation. * Significant at 10 Percent, ** Significant at 5
Percent, *** Significant at 1 Percent
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Figure A.1: Liberal Egalitarianism; ej = 1, all ai and aj
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Figure A.2: Inequality Aversion; ej = 1, all ai and aj
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dictator’s Effort (Measured 0.088*** 0.067***
in Bags Sorted) (0.006) (0.005)
Receiver’s Effort (Measured -0.119*** -0.109***
in Bags Sorted) (0.005) (0.005)
Difference in Rates 0.008*** 0.007***
of Return (0.003) (0.003)
Differences in
Contributions (Measured 0.013***
in Bottle Caps) (0.000)
Constant 0.554*** 0.769*** 0.652*** 0.644*** 0.686***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
No. of Obs. 2751 2751 2751 2751 2751
R2 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.19 0.23
Demographic and Socio-
Economic Controls NO NO NO NO NO
Table A.1: Regressions of Dictator Shares on Model Variables. * Significant at 10
Percent; ** Significant at 5 Percent; *** Significant at 1 Percent
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(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dictator’s Effort (Measured 0.097*** 0.070***
in Bags Sorted) (0.006) (0.006)
Receiver’s Effort (Measured -0.124*** -0.112***
in Bags Sorted) (0.005) (0.005)
Difference in Rates 0.008*** 0.008***
of Return (0.003) (0.003)
Differences in
Contributions (Measured 0.013***
in Bottle Caps) (0.001)
Effort Cap (Receiver) -0.029* -0.048*** 0.018 -0.011 -0.033**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Effort Cap (Dictator) 0.029** -0.017 -0.023 0.026* 0.021
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Effort Cap (Both 0.051*** -0.054*** 0.01 0.004 -0.017
Players) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Income Shock -0.052*** -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.050*** -0.055***
(Receiver) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Income Shock (Dictator) 0.021 0.014 0.014 0.02 0.019
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Income Shock (Both -0.011 -0.015 -0.01 -0.016 -0.016
Players) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 0.539*** 0.797*** 0.661*** 0.648*** 0.695***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
No. of Obs. 2751 2751 2751 2751 2751
R2 0.1 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.24
Demographic and Socio-
Economic Controls NO NO NO NO NO
Table A.2: Regressions of Dictator Shares on Model Variables (continued from pre-
vious page). * Significant at 10 Percent; ** Significant at 5 Percent; ***
Significant at 1 Percent
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A.0.1 Individual Level Regressions
SE L LE IA S
Female -0.009 -0.007 -0.038 0.057 0.050
(0.072) (0.061) (0.056) (0.059) (0.047)
Age -0.020** 0.010 -0.001 -0.002 0.010*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Age Squared 0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of Education -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 -0.005
Completed (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Head of Household -0.080 0.074 0.030 -0.021 -0.028
(0.072) (0.061) (0.056) (0.059) (0.047)
No. of Children Who Grew -0.007 0.004 0.017** 0.003 -0.010
Up in Household Together (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
No. of Children 0.011 -0.011 -0.007 0.016 -0.012
in Current Household (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
Household Asset Index -0.009 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.008
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
Household Animal 0.001 -0.000 -0.013 0.031 0.008
Ownership Index (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.44 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.13
N 384 384 384 384 384
R2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Table A.3: Regression of Weak Match Unconditional Dummies on Baseline Variables.
* Significant at 10 Percent, ** Significant at 5 Percent, *** Significant at
1 Percent
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SE L LE IA S O
Female 0.029 -0.007 -0.022 -0.001 0.020 -0.019
(0.049) (0.044) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.065)
Age -0.008 0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Age Squared 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of Education -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
Completed (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Head of Household 0.056 0.015 -0.025* 0.021 0.021 -0.089
(0.049) (0.044) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.065)
No. of Children Who Grew 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000
Up in Household Together (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
No. of Children 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.005
in Current Household (0.011) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014)
Household Asset Index -0.006 0.008 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Household Animal 0.003 -0.017 0.002 0.006 -0.005 0.011
Ownership Index (0.016) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.021)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.74
N 384 384 384 384 384 384
R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Table A.4: Regression of Strong Match Unconditional Dummies on Baseline Vari-
ables. * Significant at 10 Percent, ** Significant at 5 Percent, *** Signif-
icant at 1 Percent
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APPENDIX B
Appendices for “Are Rural Road Investments
Alone Sufficient to Generate Transport Flows?”
127
Cost Assumptions Unit Cost Unit
Round trip distance 34 km
Fuel efficiency (with one passenger) 0.29 liters/km
Round trips per day 2 trips
Bus Rental 6000 daily rental
Driver 1000 per day
Bus Cost 7000 daily rental
Fuel 213 Liter
Loss of fuel efficiency per passenger 0.0015 liters/km
Maximum passengers per bus 14 passengers
Table B.1: Annex 1: Cost assumptions
128
APPENDIX C
Appendices for “In the Public Eye: Distributional
Choices in Rural Malawi Under Perfect and
Imperfect Information”
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SE LE L IA SE, LE, L, IA
y 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Case Hidden 0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00*** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SE Loss Term 0.18*** 0.13***
(0.00) (0.02)
LE Loss Term 0.11*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
L Loss Term 0.08*** 0.04*
(0.01) (0.02)
IA Loss Term 0.04*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Log Likelihood -803.09 -837.19 -849.48 -888.08 -788.33
Number of
Observations 6264 6264 6264 6264 6264
Number of Cases 320 320 320 320 320
WaldChi2 124.65*** 91.13*** 84.14*** 59.22*** 129.82***
Table C.1: Conditional Logit Estimation. * Significant at 10 Percent, ** Significant
at 5 Percent, *** Significant at 1 Percent
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